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"LAW AND ORDER" AND PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS
OF THE ACCUSED IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN
INDIA: A GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMPARISON
K. I.
I.

SHARMA*

THE COMMON MOTIF: THE PROBLEM
OF "LAW AND ORDER"'

A.

The American Scene: Crime Control
v. Due Process

MR.

Justice Frankfurter once observed: "The history of
American freedom is, in no small measure, the history of
procedure."' - The emphasis on the procedural rights of one accused of a criminal act mirrors the value structure of the accusing society, for the arbitrary administration of justice in a free
society is both an indignity to the claims of humanity and a
damaging reproach to its legal order. Two operational norms,
which Herbert Packer has termed "criminal control" and "due
process," dominate the administration of the criminal law, and
4
they have very little in common.
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I. "Law and order" are not being used as code words for "racism." Wiener, Martial
Law Today, 55 A.B.A.J. 723 (1969).
2. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (separate opinion) ; cf. In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1967).
3. H. PACKER, THE LIMITs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149 (1968); Packer, Two
Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. Ray. 1 (1964).
4. But see Griffiths, Ideology in CriminalProcedure,or A Third Model of the Criminal
Process, 79 YAE LEJ. 359 (1970), which assails Packer's two models and says that they
really constitute one model which Griffiths terms the "Battle Model" The author suggests
another model-the "Family Model"-in which the rehabilitative ideal predominates. Actually, all these models represent different ideational approaches to the criminal process in
any given criminal justice system. Griffiths' model is somewhat analogous to the in parens
patriae approach, the efficacy of which was questioned by the Supreme Court in In re
Gault, 387 U.. 1 (1967). See also Griffiths, Review, 79 YALE L.J. 1388 (1970), reviewing
H. PACKER, supra note 3.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

In the former the basic aims are speed and finality and the
preservation of order is valued as a paramount objective: the
manner of achieving these ends is necessarily secondary. Once
the police and prosecutor are convinced of the suspect's guilt, he
should be brought to account as expeditiously as possible. Thus,
in the "crime control" model there is seen a direct relationship
between the rate at which we mete out convictions and the attainment of "domestic tranquility" and "the general welfare."" The
model is thus characterized by the overriding importance of repression of deviant behavior.
The "due process" model is altogether and irreconcilably
different. Here, formality in the fact-finding process is stressed
and an impartial tribunal is relied upon to assess the respective
claims of state and suspect: a fair trial of an accused is considered
to be more important than the conviction of the guilty. Advocates of the "due process" model are distrustful of the entire
criminal process itself and seek to correct abuses through mechanisms of the system (the courts) at the sacrifice of efficiency.
A society employing this model would accept with considerable
equanimity a substantial diminution in the efficiency with which
the criminal process operates in the interest of preventing official
oppression of the individual.
Packer thinks that recently the trend has been away from
the "crime control" model and towards the "due process" model.'
This increased concern for the rights of the accused may have
5.

Inbau, Law Enforcement, the Courts, and Individual Civil Liberties, in

CRIMINAL

JUSTIcE IN OUR TIME 99, 134 (Howard ed. 1965) (quoting the preamble to the Constitution),

6. However, in view of President Nixon's avowed purpose of appointing "strict constructionists" to the Court, we may well observe in the near future a reversal of the
pendulum. Friendly, Time and Tide in the Supreme Court, 2 CONN. L. REv. 213 (1969).
With the appointment of only two Justices, the President has already helped to blunt the
judicial revolution particularly in the area of the criminal law. And, now, in the resignations
of the late Justices Black and Harlan, the President has found a sudden opportunity to
appoint two more justices in his first term in office and, thus, to impose his own philosophy on the Court.
The Court watchers have sensed the shift in recent months. By dismissing strong language in some Warren Court rulings as mere dicta, the new Court has snipped away at
due process precedents. The shift became palpable in the case of Harris v. New York,
401 US. 222 (1971), where at issue was whether statements made by an unwarned suspect
could be used to impeach his testimony at trial. By a vote of five to four, the new
Court answered in the affirmative (provided there is no evidence of police coercion). It
thereby brushed aside language in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US. 436 (1966), that appeared
to bar uncounseled statements for any purpose. That language, observed Mr. Chief Justice
Burger for the majority, "was not at all necessary to the Court's holding and cannot be
regarded as controlling." Harris v. New York, supra at 224. The shield provided by Miranda, said the Chief Justice, "cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a
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reached its zenith during the era of the Warren Court.7 In
fostering what is popularly known as the "criminal law revolution," the Warren Court placed itself and the entire judicial system in the spotlight of a "law and order" reaction. Curiously,
this concern converges with an increase in crime and public
awareness of it. The recognition of basic procedural rights is
not new in the United States, yet it is safe to say that at no previous time in American history has the process of constitutional
interpretation been so devoted to the expanded protection of
these basic rights as in recent years. The enlarged protection is
defense." Id. at 226. Miranda was not really toppled; it was merely cut down to size.
Since the new Court is far more restrained than its activist predecessor, it is not likely
outrightly to upset the decisions of the Warren Court. See Bishop, The Warren Court Is
Not Likely to be Overruled,N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1969, § 6 (Magazine), at 31.
7. See generally Blasi, A Requiem for the Warren Court, 48 TExAs L. REv. 608, 612
(1970) ; Swindler, The Warren Court: Completion of a ConstitutionalRevolution, 23 VAND.
L. REv. 205, 238-46 (1970). A. BIcKEL, THE SuPRE E COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS
(1970), virtually ignores the contribution of the Warren Court in the area of constitutional criminal procedure.
Sol Rubin rightly observes that the Warren Court, in its concentration on the litigation
and pretrial phases of criminal justice, neglected correctional law, and that, "[lt is hard to
see how the Burger Court can do less for correction than the Warren Court did. It may
well do more." Rubin, Book Review, 16 CRIME & DELIN. 112, 114 (1970), reviewing A.
Cox, THE WARREN COURT-CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF REFORM (1968),
and THE WARREN COURT-A CRrICAL ANALYSIS (R. Sayler, B. Boyer & R. Gooding eds.
1969). The new Chief Justice has perceptively lamented the overemphasis which under the
American adversary system is placed on protecting the accused all through the trial and
appeal, to the exclusion of developing appropriate measures in rehabilitating him after
his imprisonment. Burger, "No Man Is an Island," 56 A.B.A.J. 325 (1970).
8. It was generally regarded as a decisive issue in the 1968 presidential election campaign. The phrase was used, at some points on the political spectrum, as if the two
components referred go together, like ham and eggs, in an indissoluable union of perfectly
blended elements. J. McGINNISs, THE SELLING OF THE PRESIDENT 1968, at 11-20, 242-43, 25154 (1969); Harris, Justice, NEw YORKER, Nov. 22, 1969, at 61. The shibboleth "law and
order" has deluded and mesmerized great numbers of people not only in the United States
but even abroad. See G. WooDs &P. WARD, LAW AND ORDER IN AUSTRALIA (1972) ; S. GHosH,
IMPACT OF INDUSTRIALISATION ON LAW AND ORDER [in India] (1968); Morgan, Germans Having "Law and Order" Problems Too, Boston Sunday Globe, Feb. 16, 1969, at 59, cols.
1-6; Parker, Reform in the Criminal Justice System-A Canadian Views "Law and Order,"
49 B.U.L. REv. 552 (1969); Sholl, Law and Order -American or Australian Style, 40 PENN.
B.A.Q. 108 (1968) ; Sholl, Problems of Criminal Law Enforcement-An Australian Lawyer's
Impressions in the U.S.A., 2 IND. LEGAL F. 205 (1969); Williams, Protest and Public Order,
28 CAMB. L.J. 96 (1970). For a rather jurisprudential analysis of law and order in the
context of world community, see Schwarzenberger, Law, Order and Legitimation, 23 CURRENT LEGAL PROB. 240 (1970).
9. Why Streets are Not Safe-Special Report on Crime, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
Mar. 16, 1970, at 15. Crime in the streets, as three presidential commissions-the Crime Commission, the Riot Commission, and the Violence Commission-have demonstrated, has been
part of the American social scene throughout its history and, in some earlier periods, there
may have been more unlawful behavior per capita than at present. Yet, it is quite probable that, until fairly recently, criminal violence did not affect the lives of a great many
Americans and did not seriously influence their thinking. Packer, Law and Order in the
Seventies, THE NEW REPuBLIC, Jan. 10, 1970, at 12. Stuart, A Citizen's View of the Im-
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the culmination of a constitutional 0 (as distinguished from a
common law1 ) approach to balancing the rights of the accused
against the social interest in effective law enforcement.
The constitutional approach is marked by a recognition of,
and concern for, the dignity of the individual and the inviolability of his rights. Under this approach at least two policies are
sought to be effectuated. First is the protection of judicial integrity: permitting a conviction obtained through unconstitutional means to stand, it is believed, is tantamount to a moral
sanction by the court of illegal official conduct.12 Therefore,
when law enforcement officials have acted in a manner inconsistent with what the judiciary considers constitutionally permissible, reversals of convictions and the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence seek to discourage future conduct of
this nature. 3 Second, the judiciary insures that the individual
accused is tried through fair and impartial procedures.
This mounting solicitude for the accused has primarily been
expressed in Supreme Court decisions reviewing state court convictions and affects the full range of the criminal process, from
arrest and interrogation to eventual trial and possible conviction.14 As an apparent bulwark against this so-called excessive
federalizing and constitutionalizing of the judicial system-reflected in the expansion of the procedural requirements imposed
pact of Crime, 15 CRIME & DELIN. 323, 324 (1969). However, the near hysteria over seeming increases in crime and lawlessness may be largely unwarranted in that it fails to take
account of improved detection and reporting techniques. Ohlin, The Effect of Social Change
on Crime and Law Enforcement, 43 NOTRE DAME LAw. 834, 836 (1968); Vorenberg, Is the
Court Handcuffing the Cops?, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1969, § 6 (Magazine), at 32. See generally R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERIcA (1970); R. HARIS, JusticE: THE CRISIS OF LAW, ORDER,
AND FREEDOM IN AMERICA (1970).
10. C. LY-E,THE WARREN COURT & ITs

CRmcs 77 (1968) ; Frank, The HistoricRole of
The Supreme Court, 48 Ky. L.J. 36, 41 (1959).
11. The "common law" approach is perceptively described in Neasey, The Rights of the
Accused and the Interests of the Community, 43 Ausr.L.J. 482 (1969). Under the common
law, the major function of due process is the punishment of the guilty and the protection of
the innocent from false verdicts and criminal molestation. Thus, the primary consideration
is achievement of a true verdict. "Despite the preferred values reflected in the Bill of
Rights, the criminal trial was viewed solely as a truth-seeking process .... Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 MicH. L. REv. 249, 253 (1968), in THE WARREN
COUT-A CmrTICAL ANALYSIS, 58, 62 (R. Sayler, B. Boyer &-R. Gooding eds. 1969).
12. See, e.g., Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659-60 (1961).
13. See generally T. ABBoTr et al., LAW AND TACrICs IN EXCLUSIONARY HEARINCS (1969).
14. This revolution has been aimed at restricting the states from infringing upon most
of the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights through the medium of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. See note 122, infra, and the accompanying discussion.
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upon the states' administration of criminal justice by the fourteenth amendment-judicial procrastination in many states is
still evident. For, this increasing and liberalizing regulation of
state criminal procedure by the Court-in a society pervaded by
political assassinations, 15 terror in the streets, urban guerrilla
warfare, and teenage gang violence 6-is commonly regarded by
a frustrated public as encouraging a corresponding loss of respect
for law and order.'7 Characteristic of the pressure to subordinate

individual rights to other social interests are the attempts to
establish a causal relationship between a rising crime rate and
the current judicial tendency to refine and extend constitutional
protections to criminal suspects.' 8 If there is a real relationship

between the incidence of crime and the rights of the accused,
then judges are confronted with a situation in which law may
be magnified to such a degree that disorder is countenanced as
a result. Judges must then make the difficult choice between two
values that are normally linked together.
Indeed, of late it has become almost fashionable to regard
the guarantees of personal liberty embodied in the Bill of Rights
as mere technicalities, the violation of which must be ignored if
the forces of crime are to be successfully combated.' 9 Document15.

See generally S.

BROOKS, OUR MURDERED PRESIDENTS (1966) ; A REPORT TO THE NAT'L

COM'N ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, ASSASSINATION

AND POLITICAL VIO-

LENCE (1969).

16. See generally A. SCHLESINGER, VIOLENCE: AMERICA IN THE SIXTIES (1968); REPORT
OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW AND LAW ENFORCEMENT TO THE NAT'L COMM'N ON THE CAUSES
AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, LAw AND ORDER RECONSIDERED (1969). See also McWilliams,

On Violence and Legitimacy, 79 YALE L.J. 623 (1970).
17. R. DRINAN, DEMOCRACY, DISSENT, AND DISORDER-THE ISSUES AND THE LAW S
(1969):
There exists in many American minds a hitherto suppressed but now more and
more unavoidable fear that the peaceful and proud America which everyone has
known up to the present day may have lost its way. This fear reveals itself in a
variety of ways-the most visible and vehement of which is the continued cry for a
return to law and order.
See F. ALLEN, OUR HANDCUFFED POLICE: THE ASSAULT UPON LAW AND ORDER IN AmmcA
AND 'WHAT CAN IE DONE ABOUT IT (1968); Allen, Rights in Conflict: A Balanced Approach,
3 VAL. U.L. REv. 223 (1969); Hoover, The Revolutionary-GuerrillaAttacks Law Enforcement and Democratic Society: An Analysis of the Destructive Power of the FanaticalFew,
35 ALBANY L. REv. 613 (1971).
18. A majority of the Senate Judiciary Committee not only found the existence of a
causal relationship between the recent procedural reforms and the escalating crime rate but
also concluded that they have impeded the efforts of law enforcement. See S. REP. No.
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 37-41 (1967).
19. Id. For instance, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), in which the Supreme
Court held that a defendant's pretrial statements were inadmissible at his trial, unless he had
been properly informed of his constitutional right to remain silent and to be represented by

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

ation for this is lacking, but the underlying tension between protection of individual rights and deterrence of wrongdoing leads
critics to believe that a narrowing of the rights of the accused
will be one of the most efficacious methods of coping with the
problem of rising crime rates and congested trial courts. This
is the assumption-that rights of the accused are obstacles to the
legitimate execution of police duties-which led to the passing of
the Omnibus Crime Bill,20 an act seeking to vitiate by legislation several judicially imposed procedural reforms in the criminal process in federal courts.21 Even more ominous are the various chilling instrumentalities which purport to readjust the
Bill of Rights in order to restore law and order, ranging from the
amendment of the privilege against self-incrimination," to proan attorney, has frequently been cited for its adverse effect upon efficient law enforcement.
In Philadelphia, for example, it is contended that compliance with the Miranda warnings by
the police caused the percentage of persons, arrested for serious offenses, who refused to
make a pretrial statement, to soar from 10% in 1964 to 59% in 1967. See Inbau, Misconceptions RegardingLawlessness and Law Enforcement, 35 TENN. L. Rxv. 571,576 (1968),
in 42 POLICE J. 458 (1969) (delivered as the fifth Frank Newsam Memorial Lecture). Review of hundreds of major crime cases in the Pittsburgh Bureau's Detective Branch revealed
that the percentage of investigations producing confessions, which was 54% before instituting
the full Miranda warnings, dropped afterwards to 37%, not to zero. See Burger & Wettick,
"Miranda" in Pittsburgh-A StatisticalStudy, 29 U. Prrr. L. R v. 1 (1967).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968) . Through this legislation Congress attempted to set aside
the Supreme Court decisions in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), and McNabb
v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). R. HARIus, THE FEAR OF CRIME (1969), essentially
the story of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (a "bad law" as
former Attorney-General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach describes it in his introduction), recounts how the right-wing members of Congress used the public's fear to pressure their colleagues into enacting a law that limits the age-old right of the Supreme Court to interpret
the Constitution, permits large-scale and virtually uncontrolled invasions of privacy
through bugging and wire-tapping of guilty and innocent alike, and, in general, has the
effect of further depriving the poor and the black of equality under the law.
21. For analyses of the constitutional issues raised by this legislation, directed primarily at the Miranda sections of the statute, see Alfange, CongressionalPower and Constitutional Limitations, 18 J. PUB. L. 102, 118-19 (1969); Note, Survey of Title I1: Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 Am. U.L. REv. 157, 167-77 (1968); Note,
Title II of the Conflict, 57 GEo. L.J. 438 (1968); Comment. Title I of the Omnibus
Crime Bill: A Study of the Interaction of Law and Politics, 48 NEB. L. Rav. 193 (1968);
Note, Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 HARv. L.
Rav. 1392 (1969). See also Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping:The
Politics of "Law and Order;"67 MicE. L. REv. 455 (1969).
22. See, e.g., Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional
Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 671 (1968). For an analysis of Judge Friendly's proposal
that the fifth amendment's self-incrimination clause, "nor shall [any person] be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself," be amended to bring current Supreme Court doctrine more nearly into line with the words, history, and policy of the
privilege against self-incrimination, see Thompson, Judge Friendly'sAmendment to the Fifth
Amendment: A Comment on a Recent Criticism of the Supreme Court, 38 U. CIN. L.
REv. 488 (1969). Judge Friendly would now "not at all regret having [his] proposal
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m to preventive detention.
2
viding "no-knock" legislation,9
One need hardly emphasize that substitution of expedition
for procedural protection should not be engrafted on the criminal process, because it seems somewhat Orwellian to place the public convenience above the most fundamental of all individual
for a constitutional amendment placed on the back burner until we see what the Burger
Court will do." Friendly, Time and Tide in the Supreme Court, 2 CONN. L. REv. 213,
220 (1969). Judge Friendly is rightly of the view that the "[Burger] Court has many
other available means for changing course without being false to either the letter or the
spirit of what has been [on matters of criminal procedure]." Id. at 219. See also Richards,
Chief Justice Burger: Whither Now the Supreme Court, 15 S.D.L. REv. 41 (1970).
23. D.C. Code § 2212 (a) (eff. Feb. 1, 1970) ; Comment, The New "No Knock" Provision
and Its Effect on the Authority of the Police to Break and Enter, 20 AM. U.L. REv.
467 (1970-71) ; Comment, No-Knock and the Constitution: The District of Columbia Court
Reform and the Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, 55 MINN. L. REv. 871 (1971); Comment,
"No Knock" Search and Seizure and the District of Columbia Crime Act: A Constitutional
Analysis, 62 J. CiM. L.C. & P.S. 350 (1971).
24. The provision amending the Bail Reform Act of 1966, would, inter alia, permit the
federal courts to detain up to sixty days prior to trial certain types of dangerous defendants. For a discussion of the constitutionality and wisdom of this provision, see Ailington, Preventive Detention of the Accused Before Trial, 19 U. KAN. L. REv. 109 (1970);
Hruska, Preventive Detention: The Constitution and the Congress, 3 CREIGHTON L. REv. 36
(1969); Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionalityof Pretrial Detention, 55 VA. L.
REv. 1223 (1969); Portman, "To Detain or Not to Detain"--A Review of the Background,
Current Proposals,and Debate on Preventive Detention, 10 SANTA CLARA LAW. 224 (1970);
Comment, Preventive Detention and the Proposed Amendment to the Bail Reform Act of
1966, 11 WM. &MARY L. REv. 525 (1969).
The assumptions, underlying such a provision, are perceptively assailed by Harvard
Law School Professor, Alan M. Dershowitz. See his testimony, Hearings on the Amendments to the Bail Reform Act of 1966 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 172 (1969); Dershowitz,
Preventive Detention: Social Threat, TRIAL, Dec.fJan. 1969-70, at 22; Dershowitz, Preventing "Preventive Detention," N.Y. REviEw OF BooKs, Mar. 13, 1969, at 18; Dershowitz,
Imprisonment by Judicial Hunch, 57 A.B.A.J. 560 (1971). A reply to Professor Dershowitz's criticisms is attempted in Landau, Preventive Detention-Public Safeguard, TRIAL,
Dec./Jan. 1969-70, at 23. See also Goldstein, Jail Before Trial, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 8,
1969, at 15; Ervin, Foreword: Preventive Detention-A Step Backward For Criminal Jutice, 6 HARV. CIV. RIGHTs-CIv. LIB. L. Rrv. 291 (1971). A persuasive rejoinder to Attorney
General Mitchell's historical justification for denying bail in serious felony cases appears
in Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of John Mitchell,
56 VA. L. REv. 371 (1970). This debate about preventive detention is ably analyzed and
evaluated in Borman, The Selling of Preventive Detention 1970, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 879
(1971).
In Dobrovir, Preventive Detention: The Lesson of Civil Disorders, 15 VILL. L. REv.
313 (1970), "the facts respecting judicial preventive detention in the context of civil
disorders are set out and evaluated to see what light they shed upon the wisdom,
necessity, and efficacy of preventive detention legislation." Id. at 316. The author concludes
that the "evidence appearing from study of preventive detention as applied in recent
civil disorders demonstrates the unwisdom of the device. Judges are ill-equipped to predict
accurately whether any one is likely to commit a new offense if released." Id. at 330.
See also Comment, Pretrial Detention in the District of Columbia: A Common Law
Approach, 62 J. C~is. L.C. & P.S. 194 (1971); Note, The Costs of Preventive Detention, 79
YALE L.J. 926 (1970); Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Conditions of Pretrial
Detention, 79 YALE L.J. 941 (1970).
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rights-the right to exist as a free man. Although pragmatic considerations certainly must play a role in all constitutional adjudication, to argue that highly important rights must be forgotten because their vindication will result in some crimes not
being punished is to ignore the traditional role of the judiciary
in the American system. This is, however, not to suggest that the
Supreme Court, in advocating its conception of rights, has necessarily reached the proper results. Neither is it to suggest that
the Court's interpretation may not be questioned as manifestations of an excessive zeal for constitutional rights at the expense
of other public interests also served by the constitutional order.2 r
The point of emphasis is, rather, that the protection of rights
of the accused now occupies a central place in the Court's role
as protector of the constitutional system and that the abdication
of such role would do more fundamental damage to quintessential
social values than a certain amount of unrequited "crime in
the streets."

25.

The most publicized decisions may have favored the accused, but contrary to

popular assumptions, the Court has not been a "criminal's court" (Kamisar, Do Police
Sometimes Practice "Civil Disobedience" Too?, TRiAL, Oct./Nov. 1968, at 15), but has
in recent decisions acted very favorably toward law enforcement in the investigative area.
Thus, for example, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court approved the
police's zealously sought power to "stop and frisk" a suspect on less than probable cause.
In Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), it upheld the right of police to plant
an informant in a suspect's quarters, and in Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323
(1966), it allowed such an informant to tape record a private conversation. Moreover, the
Court has protected the "anonymity of an informer" (McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300
(1967)) and the right of the police to extract blood samples over a suspect's protest
(Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)), or from an unconscious person (Breithaupt
v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957)). Finally, in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), the
Court reversed a long-standing proscription against the seizure of "mere evidence." Many
of the landmark decisions were denied retroactive effect (see, e.g., Johnson v. New Jersey,
384 U.S. 719 (1966); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965)). See also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968); Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39
(1966). All these practices entail serious invasions of civil liberties, but the need for
effective law enforcement was thought by the Court to be more important.
Lately, the Court has seemed to draw back from a strong libertarian position. See
generally Griswold, Criminal Procedure, 1969-Is It a Means or an End?, 29 MD. L. Rv.
307 (1969); Kitch, The Supreme Court's Code of Criminal Procedure: 1968-1969 Edition,
1969 Sup. Or. REv. 155; Loewy, The Warren Court as Defender of State and Federal
Criminal Laws: A Reply to Those Who Believe That the Court is Oblivious to the Needs
of Law Enforcement, 37 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 1218 (1969); Steel, Nine Men in Black
Who Think White, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1967, § 6 (Magazine), at 56, col. 1.

"LA',W AND ORDER"

B.

The Indian Scene: PoliticalComplexion
of Growing Lawlessness

Turning to the Indian scene, in the absence of a comprehensive publication of nationwide criminal statistics for administrative and operational use of law enforcement agencies, it is
difficult to make a sophisticated criminological assessment of the
real magnitude of general crime conditions. As one scholar has
ably demonstrated," it would be unrealistic to construct an accurate picture solely from the annual reports of crime prepared
by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, because
they seem to overlook factors like the variables associated with
demographic changes, improved crime reporting procedures, and
the statistical skill and resources in reporting agencies of various
states. For instance, during the 1960-1965 period, the report
showed a nearly twenty-four percent increase in cognizable offenses, 27 although this period had also witnessed a general population rise of nearly thirteen percent 28 It is unclear from the
statistics if at least some percentage of the increase in crime
could be attributed to this increase in population.
Although there is no empirical study questioning the reporting practices of Indian citizens of crimes which might otherwise
be processed but are not officially known to the police, it seems
quite probable in light of the Indian tradition of mediation, 29
cultural unwillingness to report crimes of rape and adultery for
fear of societal stigma 30 and the research done by the President's
Crime Commission in the United States31 that the amount of
26. See Penegar, Appraising the System of Criminal Law, Its Processes and Administration, 10 J. IND. L. INsT. 353, 357-67 (1968), for a "summary analysis" of the reports
of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, "placed
in the wider context of Indian as well as American conditions." Professor Penegar's
article also appears in 47 N.C.L. Rav. 69 (1968), but without any particular references
to Indian law.
27. GovERNMENT OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF Hora AFFAIRS, CRIME IN INDIA 1 (1967).
28. "Id. This is, however, not to support that statistics in the United States are flawless;
in fact, R. CLARK, supra note 9, throughout the book, makes a mockery of the F.B.I.
statistics. "If the crime measured [by the F.B.I. crime clock] occuned in the Virgin
Islands the whole population would be dead of murder in three years, having been
previously raped twice and robbed eighteen times." Id. at 44-45.
29. L. RUDOLPH & S. RUDOLPH, THE MODERNITY OF TRADnON 251-93 (1967).
30. G. Sharma, Horizons of Indian Legal Philosophy, 2 JAIPUR L.J. 180, 191 (1962),
in EssAYs IN INDIAN JURISPRUDENCE 1, 12 (G. Sharma ed. 1964).
31. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967).
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crime reported represents only a fraction of that which has actually occurred. Comparison of the incredible disproportion of
about three million index crimes in the United States for one
year-1965-as against a mere 628,713 cognizable offenses for a
society with a population over twice the size of the United States
lends some support to the existence of this suspected discrep32

ancy.

Notwithstanding the unavailability of reliable statistics, it
is common knowledge, at least over the period of the last ten
years, that there has been a phenomenal increase in both crimes
of violence (homicide, kidnapping, abduction, rape, adultery,
dacoity and robbery) as well as in crimes of property (housebreaking, theft, misappropriation, cheating, and counterfeiting).
For instance, more recently, the incidence of crime in Delhi and
in other Union Territories showed an upward trend in 1970 compared to 1969, according to the Home Ministry's annual report
for 1970-1971. 33 The report said that a special squad had been
formed in the Central Intelligence Department Crime Branch of
Delhi Police to investigate matters regarding organized gangs
of criminals.
This traditional problem of crime has now become all the
more telling, because of its political complexion. The newspapers
of the past three years or so have been littered with stories concerning the gheraos of various industrial units, 34 the restlessness

among educated youth, 5 the growing accent on anti-authoritarianism in the political culture of India,3" and, of course, sense32. Penegar, supra note 26, at 367.
33. The Indian Express (New Delhi), June 16, 1971, at 3, cols. 3-6 (city cd.).
34. "Gherao literally means 'encircle' or 'surround.' A gherao occurs when the
workmen, in order to force an employer to accept their demands, surround his office or
residence, or that of his executive. They block ingress and egress. They sometimes cut
off electricity, telephones, even food and water. A gherao is usually short; but may be
long." INDIAN LAW INSTrUTE, LABOUR LAW AND LABOUR RELATIONS 260 (1968). See also
A. AGGARWAL, GHERAOS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1968); V. ARYA, STRIKES, LocK-OuTs
AND GHERAOS 61-65 (1967).
See Christian Science Monitor, Boston, Jan. 16, 1970, at 7, col. 5: "Law and order
in West Bengal have broken down; various industries have been hit by strikes and disorders inspired by the communist state government."
The Law Commission has recently suggested a drastic overhaul of the Indian Penal
Code to provide, among other things, rigorous punishment for gheraos. The Hindustan
Times (New Delhi), June 7, 1971, at 1, cols. 1-3.
35. See, e.g., Shanti Swarup, Student Unrest in India, in PROTEST AND DISSENT 151
(B. Crick & W. Robson eds. 1970).
36. See, e.g., Kashyap, The Politics of Defection: The Changing Contours of the
Political Power Structure in State Politics in India, 10 ASIAN SURVEY 196 (1970); Singh,

PoliticalDevelopment or PoliticalDecay in India?,44 PAcIFIc
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less brutal political murders3 7 and communal atrocities.3
editorial of a leading daily newspaper observed: 9

An

The seeds of violence and lawlessness in West Bengal, laid during the rule of the CPM-led coalition, continue, but nothing
illustrates the present state of law and order there better than
the fact that the efforts to restore normalcy in railway operations in the region have not met with much success. Naxalite[40 ]
activities have created a feeling of insecurity. .. The trains are
a favourite target of anti-social elements, and disruption of train
traffic is adversely affecting the country's economy by hindering the
movement of industrial raw materials and goods 41
Interestingly, this kind of growing lawlessness and the per-

sistent trend of senseless violence in the country's political
style, particularly in West Bengal, and in the activities of Shiv
Sena,
figured as one of the major issues in the recent
mid-term elections of the Indian Parliament. Reminiscent of the
1968 American presidential campaign style, one of the planks of
Mrs. Indira Gandhi's party's election manifesto was to preserve
37. Indians are now much more concerned about this than they used to be, and a
recent book on the subject begins: "This book . . .is concerned with the growth of
violence in the country which has taken a turn for the worse since the death of
otrrxcs OF MASS VIOLENCE IN INDIA 15 (S. Aiyar ed. 1967).
Lal Bahadur Shastri." TM
See also the symposium issue on violence in SEMINAR (No. 116, April 1969).
38. While the Constitution has committed India to the ideal of a secular state, the
country has yet to become a secular society. Nothing perhaps bears this out more than
the ever-recurring tale of communal riots even after twenty-three years of independence.
The story of communal violence in Bhiwandi near Bombay is one of the tragic cases in
point. One may recall here the question which a Congress member, Krishna Kant, asked
the then Home Minister, Y. B. Chavan, in the Council of States:
Is it not a fact that the arson took place in Jalgoan after the procession
passed off peacefully after two hours? Is it also not a fact that the marriage
party of a Muslim family was bolted and burnt in a small hut where four
children-9 years, 7 years, 5 years, and 3 years-were there and their widowed
mother came running and she wept: "I beg of you please at least give me
one of my sons. I will convert him to Hinduism"?
Chavan replied in a subdued voice,
Sir, it must be admitted that it was a very merciless brutal attack on the
Muslim families. It is a fact that a marriage party was burnt in one house.
It is also a true story of a widowed mother that he mentioned. I met her.
The picture I saw of that mother will haunt me throughout my life.
Quoted in a feature article entitled Dark Shadow of Bhiwandi, LINK, May 17, 1970,
at 10.
39. The Indian Express (New Delhi), June 18,1971, at 6, col. 1 (city ed.).
40. For a fine description of the Naxalite movement, see Ghosh, The Naxalite Struggle in West Bengal, 4 SouT ASIAN Rrv. 99 (1971).
41. The Indian Express (New Delhi), June 18, 1971, at 6, col. 1 (city ed.).
42. "Shiv Sena," which means "the Army of Shivaji" a seventeenth century Mahratta
warrior, is a kind of militant organization-in some respects comparable to the Black
Panthers in the United States-which has the objective of having the state of Maharashtra
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lIw and order so that all citizens could live in peace and harmony.
After her party's landslide victory, the new government, precisely in pursuance of its election manifesto of combating forces
of lawlessness, successfully piloted through the Parliament the
Maintenance of Internal Security Bill. Defending the bill, in the
Lok Sabha,43 Mr. K. C. Pant, Minister for Home Affairs, catalogued the circumstances" which had compelled the government
to come forward with the unpalatable bill, providing for preventive detention. Political violence, increasing lawlessness on
the railways, 45 attempts at disrupting secularism, elements seeking inspiration from across the border, infiltration of Pakistani
spies along with the massive influx of refugees from Bangla Desh,
terrorization and killings and the reluctance of eye witnesses of
daylight murders to testify in the courts for fear of reprisalswere, he said, facts of life. Since these factors tended to glamorize
violence and destroy cherished values, Mr. Pant urged the members not to be obsessed with academic concepts of liberty but
adopt a realistic approach. Mr. Pant, however, assured everybody that this law would not be used to suppress the legitimate
movements of workers and farmers. It would be used as sparingly as possible, and certainly not against political adversaries.
However, Mr. Pant urged all political parties to abjure violence
and to abide by the "rules of the game" within the framework
of the nation's liberal Constitution.46

only for Maharashtrians. Strongly parochial, the organization resents any kind of participation-economic, political, social-in Maharashtra by non-Maharashtrians. It believes
that non-Maharastrians ought to leave Maharashtra, and if they decline to do so, they
ought to be made to leave. This simplistic but satisfying idea appealed to the Mahrattas
who, very shortly thereafter, started to act on it. See generally Joshi, The Shiv Sena:
A Movement in Search of Legitimacy, 10 ASIAN SURVEY 967 (1970).
43.

Lower House of Parliament, similar to England's House of Commons.

44. The Indian Express (New Delhi), June 18, 1971, at 1, cols. 1-4.
45. For example, the Sealdah division of the Eastern Railway has the dubious distinction of being in the forefront in the matter of alarm-chain pulling as well as
in other forms of anti-social and criminal activities connected with the railways. Menon,
Lawlessness on the Suburban Railway, The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), June 22,
1971, at 5, cols. 1-2 (city ed.).
46. The Times of India (New Delhi), June 19, 1971, at 1, col. 1 (city ed.). These
assurances were reiterated by Mr. Pant in the Rajya Sabha also. The Hindustan Times
(New Delhi), June 25, 1971, at 1, cols. 2-3.
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C.

A Comparative Excursus: Relevance
of American Experience for India

Mr. Pant's account of the state of affairs in India evidences
the strong move of many Indian political leaders towards a "crime
control" view of the problem of law and order. Thus, as in
the United States, some of the constitutional protections available
to the accused are also under attack as obstacles to effective law
enforcement. However, the response to this similar movement in
both countries should be tempered by the cultural and institutional differences of the two societies.
In the United States today because of the perceived need on
the part of many to dramatize civil rights, to underscore individual liberties, and to mobilize sentiment against the Vietnam War,
employing civil disobedience 8 techniques or engaging in other
extralegal activitiesO9 does not seem to entail the disapprobation
it once did. In fact, among young militants and certain portions of the intelligentsia, there seems to be a bias against law
and order qua law and order. The growth of this sentiment,
without stressing the means to bring "change," "flexibility," and
"social alteration" has perhaps obscured the fact that one prerequisite for evolutionary and lasting political and social development is the maintenance of at least a semi-stable public order;
for total flux and turmoil are as detrimental to progress as a
stultifying status quo. The United States and other highly developed nations, unlike India, may have the institutional frame47. The Indian press has also reacted favorably toward a "crime control" view of
the problem of lawlessness. For example, to quote from an editorial of a leading daily:
A preventive detention law no doubt carries the risk that a few innocent
persons may at times be held without trial. But the [Maintenance of Internal
Security Bill] provides for a review of each case by an independent board consisting of three persons all of whom have held the position of a judge or are
qualified to hold it. There is no reason to assume that all these men will
[N]o democratic regime
agree to be subservient tools of the Government ....
can ever allow any party to use murder as a political weapon. The situation in
West Bengal where political murders have become a daily routine has already
become impossible. The parties responsible for this will have only themselves to
blame if the new law is also used to curb the activities of those who plan to
abuse democratic liberties to subvert the democratic system.
The Times of India (New Delhi), June 21, 1971, at 6, col. 1 (city ed.).
48. The literature on civil disobedience is legion. Various viewpoints are ably
evaluated in Greenawalt, A Contextual Approach to Disobedience, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 48
(1970); Johnson, Civil Disobedience and the Law, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1089 (1969).
49. See, e.g., Morris, Student Participation in Law School Decision Making, 22 J.
LEGAL ED. 127 (1970).
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work to permit some extralegal activities and to provide for
highly charged demand pressures. Political systems like that of
India, however, lack these institutional buffers, and the police
force and legal framework may be the only forces standing between powerful pressure groups and the maintenance of a viable
political systemYn° Agitational politics has now become for many
people a substitute for institutional means of exercising influence
and of seeking redress of grievances. As such, the problem of conflict between individual freedom and the practical necessity of
maintaining order assumes even more importance in a mammoth
and extremely complex society like India than in the United
States. The incidence of social violence has affected the policethe government's primary agency of social control-in marked
ways: apart from financial stringency, the threat of violence is
the single most important formative element shaping the police
in modem India. The over-arching responsibility of the police
in their own minds and in the minds of civil officials is to quell
civil disorders and preserve "law and order." Although the police
are primarily responsible for preventing individual crimes and
apprehending common criminals, they are aware that careers
are made and broken by the single issue of law and order.
Although the literature relating to the problems of law and
order vis-at-vis the rights of the accused in India is very sparse, 51
this should not induce one to surmise that there are no constitutional and statutory provisions in India which guarantee substantive and procedural safeguards to a suspect or an accused.
The personal liberties, inviolate under Anglo-American law, are
contained in a number of pre-Constitution provisions embodied
in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, Indian Evidence Act,
50. See generally D. BAYLEY, THE POLICE AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA
(1969).
51. This fact is reflected by a perusal of the seminal papers presented at the
Northwestern University School of Law's International Conference on Criminal Law
Administration in 1960. These papers, first published in four parts by the Journal of
Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, are collected in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (C. Sowle ed. 1962). These studies, dealing with four areas-arrest and
detention, search and seizure, police interrogation, and self-incrimination-in Canada,
England, France, Germany, Israel, Japan and Norway, do not investigate Indian law despite the voluminous body of relevant case law which has been adjudicated there.
Likewise, a very recent British Institute of International and Comparative Law Study,
surveying the "rights of the accused" in many countries-England, France, Scotland, United
States, Northern Ireland, New Zealand, Malaysia, Israel, South Africa, Germany, Poland
and the U.S.S.R.-dispenses with its analysis of Indian jurisprudence in about one paragraph. THE AccusE-A CoMPARATvE STUDY (J. Coutts ed. 1966).
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1872, and other enactments. These safeguards, some of which
are also enshrined in the Constitution in the chapter on fundamental rights, are: presumption of innocence;5 2 freedom from
illegal arrest and detention; 53 right to be produced before a
magistrate within twenty-four hours; 4 right of bail; 55 right to
have notice of charge;6 right to counsel;57 right to public
trial in the accused's presence; 55 right to produce and examine
defense witnesses and cross-examine prosecution witnesses; 9
right to discovery of statements; 0 immunity from testimonial
compulsion,6 ' double jeopardy,6 2 and retroactive operation of
criminal law;63 right of appeal; 4 etc.
An examination of the scope and relative degree of importance given to these rights of the suspect (or accused), which
constitute the ingredients of a "fair trial" 65 "implicit in the con' would offer an insight into the procept of ordered liberty,"66
cess of criminal justice as it operates in a given context. The mere
presence of these rights in a statute or constitution does not
mean that their content is also the same everywhere. For example,
although India has adopted guarantees similar to those of the
fifth and sixth amendments of the United States Constitution, the
interpretation and application of these provisions governing
52. Indian Evidence Act, 1872, §§ 102, 105. See also Sharma, Defence of Insanity in
Indian Criminal Law, 7 J. IND. L. INST. 325, 867-71 (1965).
53. INDIA CONST. arts. 22 (1) & (2) (1950) ; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, §§ 60,
61, 64, 167, 344.
54. INDIA CONSr. art. 22 (1) (1950) ; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, § 61.
55. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, § 496. The Supreme Court has, however, held
that a state high court, in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under section 561-A
of the Code, has power to cancel bail even in a bailable case, if the subsequent activity
of the accused is subversive of the fair progress of the trial. Talab Haji Hussein v. M.P.
Mondker, [1958] S.C.R. 1226. Cf. Hall, Subsequent Misconduct as Ground for Forfeiture
of the Right to Release on Bail-A Proposal,15 N.Y.L.F. 873 (1969).
56. INDIA CONS-. art. 22(l) (1950); Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, § 173 (4).
57. INDIA CONSr. art. 22 (1) ; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, § 340 (1).
58. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, § 352.
59. Indian Evidence Act, 1872, §§ 137, 188, 143; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898,
§§ 207 (5) & (9), 208 (2), 244, 251 (A) (8) & (9), 256 (1), 257 (1), 286, 290, 291.
60. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, §§ 162, 173 (4), 207-A (3).
61. INDIA CONsT. art. 20(3) (1950); Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, §§ 342 (2),
342A.
62. INDIA CONsT. art. 20 (2), (1950) ; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, § 403 (1).
63. INDIA CONsT. art. 20 (1) (1950).
64. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, § 371 (3).
65. In fact, the right to a fair trial has figured prominently in the efforts made in recent
years to guarantee human rights at an international level. See generally Harris, The Right to
a FairTrial in Criminal Proceedingsas a Human Right, 16 INrrL & Comp. L.Q. 352, 364-67
(1967).
66. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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criminal prosecutions differ between the two systems in many respects because of differing historical backgrounds and societal
needs. Despite the disparate historical and political backgrounds
of both countries, the American and Indian systems, both the
outgrowth of the same mother lode of the English common law,
offer many similarities. Both share similar expectations and ideals
about the role of justice under law in a democratic society.
India shares the American heritage of gaining independence from
the British Empire and then adopting a written constitution
with a bill of rights, patterned in large part after the American
document. An insight into the legislative and judicial responses
of the United States, would help one extrapolate (through a
comparative analysis)" techniques of improving Indian legal
rules and the methods of criminal-constitutional adjudication.
The "already mature American experience""" is particularly instructive concerning the role of the independent judiciary, not
only in the protection of constitutional rights of the suspect or
accused but also in the creative interpretation and extension of
these rights and, indeed, in the creation of new rights. In the
exercise of its power of judicial review, the Supreme Court of
the United States has acquired a prestige and exerts an influence
probably unparalleled in history.!" The Indian courts, perhaps
more than the courts of any other country, have avidly looked to
American constitutional law precedents for guidance. The
opinion in practically every important case is liberally sprinkled
with references to American decisions and authors, as are the
standard Indian texts on constitutional law.10
67. See generally Rheinstein, Comparative Law-Its Functions, Methods and Usages,
22 ARK. L. REv. 415 (1968).
68. von Mehren, Book Review, 4 J. IND. L. INsT. 569 (1962).
69. See generally R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT (1969); M. CAPPELLETI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD (1971); M. FRANKLIN, TiHE
DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN LAw (1968); P. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES

(1961); C. FRIEDRiCH, THE IMPACT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM ADROAD 92

(1967) ("the basic idea of judicial review is of American origin"); Kauper, Judicial
Review of Constitutional Issues in the United States, in AfAX-PLANCK-INSTITUT FOR AUSLANDISCHES

6FFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT,

VERFASSUNGSGERIC11TSBARKEIT

IN DER

GEGENWART 568 (H. Mosler ed. 1962); Kauper, The Supreme Court: Hybrid Organ of
State, 21 Sw. L.J. 573 (1967); Noland, Stare Decisis and the Overruling of Constitutional
Decisions in the Warren Years, 4 VAL. U.L. REv. 101 (1969); Wright, The Role of
the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society-Judicial Activism or Restraint, 54 CORNELL
L.Q. 1 (1968).
70. H. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW" OF INDIA 33-36

(1967),

has, however, cau-

tioned against the use of American doctrines of "police power" and "eminent domain"
and other concepts in interpreting the various provisions of the Indian Constitution.
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Our focus is upon the relevance of the American experience to India, not merely because its system has been the most
widely emulated, but also because many of the alterations in
the judicial system of other countries, including India, have been
adopted for the express purpose of evading the defects, real or
hypothetical, of the American system. However, if such a comparison is to be more than superficial, it must be attempted in
light of divergencies of tradition, forms of government, differing
legal frameworks, and social environments. 1

II.

SOME INSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCES
IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXTS

While the experience of a foreign country is rarely transferable in full to another legal system, suggestive ideas can be
derived from it to assist in the more rational jurisprudential de-

velopment of the potential transferee. It would be instructive,
then, to look to the key institutional differences-federal structure,
due process, jury trial, etc.-deriving from the distinctive histories of the two countries under discussion, before examining the
viability of the adaptation by India of the judicial approach developed by American jurists. In this process we can sort out

those developments peculiarly conditioned by history and those
71. Cf. von Mehren, Roscoe Pound and Comparative Law, 13 Am. J. Comp. L.
507, 514-15 (1964):
Comparative study of non-Western systems ordinarily will not be rewarding
with respect to specific problems of rule and institution because of divergencies
between relevant social values and practices. However, illumination can be cast by
comparative work on pervasive questions underlying the entire legal order: How
specific or universal is the Western idea of law? What premises are basic to Western
thinking about the manner in which disputes are to be resolved and about the
proper content of norms regulating conduct? How universally are these premises
shared? What moral assumptions, cultural traditions, historic experience, and
economic considerations are reflected in a given society's attitude toward problems
of social control? Finally, what can be said about the various forms that generalized
social control-which we in the West have entrusted so largely to the legal ordertakes in different societies and cultures?
' ' * Comparative-law scholarship-unlike certain kinds of domestic-law scholarship-can never be content with a largely informational presentation. If its work
is to have significance, comparative scholarship must always seek insight at one level
or another-practice, procedure, judicial and governmental structure, substance-into the operation of the legal systems under investigation. The comparatist's concern with structure and detail is with a view to understanding processes of growth
and development and habits of thought.
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which inhere in some underlying conception of fairness and
justice founded on the worth and dignity of the person.
Some notions of rights are historically conditioned. The
limitations stated in the American Bill of Rights that troops may
not be quartered in houses without the consent of the owner and
that the right to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed cannot be understood except in relation to the American colonial
experience. They cannot be extolled as basic universal rights for
importation.
A. Differentiation in FederalStructures
Neither system can be understood without a pragmatic72
understanding of its federal structure, particularly in a study of
those problems which concern "law and order." India and the
United States both have federal constitutions, 3 though "the
historical, political and economic needs which create the urge to
federalism were completely absent" 74 in India. The Indian federation, unlike the American, did not arise out of a pact between
several sovereign states, which knitted themselves together, surrendering some of their sovereign or autonomous powers to the
general government." It came into being as an expedient whereby
states, heterogeneous in themselves, might be joined in a nation72.

P. FRaUND, FEDERALISM IN AMERICA 5, 14 (Perspectives US.A. No. 10, 1955):
There is no better insight into American pragmatism than American Federation. The neglect of law by philosophers has been unfortunate for both disciplines.... At all events, a study of the operation of federalism through the
judicial opinions of Justices Holmes and Brandeis, Hughes and Stone, might be
a more pragmatic exercise than the reading of William James on Pragmatism.
Such a study would at least help to dispel the notion that no judge in terms
of consequences is to abandon ideals and moral norms. So to judge in the
maintenance of federalism is to bring the ideals of the constitutional order to
bear on the jarring lives of men and states.
73. An excellent bibliographical essay on Indian federalism is available in Leonard,
Federalism in India, in FEDERALISM IN THE COMMONWEALTH: A BIDLIOGRAPHIcAL Cost-

MENTARY 87-145 (W. Livingstone ed. 1963).
74. M. SETALVAD, THE COMMON LAW IN INDIA 169 (1st ed. 1960).
75. For an examination of the "multiple forces and influences which shaped the
nature of Indian federalism," see A. RAY, INTER-GOvERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN INDIAA STUDY OF INDIAN FEDERALISM 9-20, 43 (1966). The federal institutions grafted upon

the Indian milieu are not the prototype of the constitutional structure of the United
States, which is believed to comport with traditionalists' set of criteria. M. FRANDA,
W Sr BENGAL AND THE FEDERALIZING PROCESS IN INDIA 179 (1968): "While federalism is
not mentioned specifically in the Indian Constitution, it is clear that India's constitu.
tion-makers envisaged a series of federal institutions that would be appropriate to
their political environment." For an appraisal of the nature of the Indian federalism,
see generally B. RAY,EvOLUTION OF FEDERALISM IN INDIA (1967).
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al union. Before 1950, the Indian provinces were units formed
on the basis of administrative convenience with negligible autonomy of their own.

6

The Constitution-makers had to create

simultaneously, as did the framers of the Government of India
Act of 1935, a general government with constituent regional
units.7 7 While the Constitution of the United States served simply
as the constitution of the national government, leaving it in main
to the states to continue to preserve their own constitutions by a
convention (or in the case of new admissions-to draw up their
own constitutions by a convention) or to amend them, the Indian Constitution (like that of Canada) serves both as the composite constitution of the federation (the Union of India) and
of each of the constituent states." The Indian Constitution
defines the powers of both the state and federal legislatures over
the whole field of actual and potential law-making. The American
Constitution, on the other hand, defines the relationship between
the Congress and the various state legislatures and in the absence
of any specific enumeration of state powers, any power not
specifically set out in the federal Constitution is reserved to the
states.79
Similarly, though India has a federal constitution, she has an
almost entirely unitary system of courts. An integrated single judiciary (as in Canada and in Australia)! administering both federal and state laws, avoids the jurisdictional problems arising out
of the concurrent systems of federal and state courts.8 0 Thus,
there is no dichotomy of federal and state questions as in the
United States."' Also, the single hierarchy of the Indian judicial
system would seem to grant more powers to the Supreme Court
76. See generally R. WaTrs, NEv F EDRATIONS-EXPIMENTs IN THE COMMONWEALTH 18-19 (1966).
77. See P. MUKHARJI, THE CRITIcAL PROBLEMS OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 128
(1967).
78. With one exception in the case of Jammu and Kashmir. INDIA CONST. art.
370 (l) (1950).
79. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
80. Such problems are alluded to in von Mehren, Conflict of Laws in a Federal
System: Some Perspectives, 18 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 681 (1969).
81. See Kelman, Federal Habeas Corpu as a Source of New Constitutional Requirements for State Criminal Procedure, 28 OHIo ST. L.J. 46 (1967):
It is a unique characteristic of American federalism that within each territorial jurisdiction there exists a dual system of courts, each having a part in
enforcing the laws of the other authority. Federal courts apply state law in the
exercise of their diversity and pendent jurisdictions, and state courts apply
federal law, including the United States Constitution, in a kaleidoscopic variety
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over inferior courts than in the United States, although, in practice, the Supreme Court of the United States has exercised sweeping powers over state courts. There is a provision in the Indian
Constitution"2 empowering Parliament to create additional courts
for the better administration of federal laws, but no such court has
yet been established. Moreover, instituting any separate system of
federal courts for the administration of federal laws as a regular
feature of the judicial administration seems quite unlikely.M
India's unitary judicial system evolved out of the operational legal establishment of British-ruled India, and no change was
suggested when a federal scheme was first planned by the framers
of the Government of India Act of 1935. The experience of the
unified system was too deeply-rooted to be disturbed. Not only
is the judicial organization under the Indian Constitution unified, but the control over the judiciary is also unified or centralized, for although "administration of justice" is a state subject,8'
in view of the duality of functions, the judges of the state high
of cases. Not only do local courts apply national law and vice versa, but as

a general matter litigation begins and ends in the same system of courts. When
a question of state law arises in a federal court action, its determination, with
some exceptions, is in the hands of that tribunal and there is no opportunity

for review by a state court, even though it is conceded that the state appellate
courts speak with ultimate authoity on matters of state law. Similarly, when
an issue of federal law arises in state court litigation, its final resolution more

often than not is left to the local courts.
Id. At the apex of the Indian judicature stands the Supreme Court which is the

only federal court in the Indian judicial system. The Court has a fully comprehensive
jurisdiction and its decisions are binding on other Indian courts; however, the Supreme
Court has more than once declared that it is not bound by the rule of stare decisis in constitutional cases. See generally Saxena, The Doctrine of Precedent in India:
A Study of Some of Its Aspects, 3 JAIPUR, L.J. 188 (1963), in ESSAYS IN INDIAN JURISPRUDENCE 110 (G. Sharma ed. 196-). High courts stand at the head of the judicial
administrations in the states. The structure of subordinate courts, subject to minor
local variations, is more or less uniform throughout the country. A state is divided
into sessions divisions, in each of which there is a sessions judge who tries the more
serious crimes. There are also magistrates under the control of the district magistrate,
who try the less serious offenses. Under the Constitution there is no dual system of
administration of justice; the courts administer both federal and state laws with the
Supreme Court as the final appellate court. INDIA CONST. arts. 132-36 (1950).
82. INDIA CoNsr. art. 247 (1950).
83. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, THE ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS ComiIssioN, REPORT ON
CENTRE-STATE RELATIONSHIPS

(1969),

did not favor even as a temporary measure the

"establishing [of] alternative machinery [of federal courts] for ensuring compliance with
the Central Government's orders by the State Government or for the running of its
writ without resorting to or making use of the State Government's machinery. .. ."
Id. at 38. The reason for this reluctance lay not only in the enormous increase in
expenditure entailed in such a course of action, but also in the risk that such courts
would act as a constant irritant between the central and state authorities.
84. INDIA CONsT. state list, entry 3 (1950).
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courts are to be appointed and removed by the central govern-

ment in the same manner as justices of the Supreme Court.,5
Similarly, as the state legal apparatus is used for administering
union laws, article 256 of the Indian Constitution confers on the
union the right to issue directions to implement those laws."(
Furthermore, the Indian Constitution lacks an equivalent of
the American ninth and tenth amendments, reserving to the
states unspecified "powers," not delegated to the federal government or prohibited to the states or the people. 7 As contrasted
to the United States, whose constitutional scheme vests a broad
discretion in the states to enact and enforce laws for their governance, provided they do not violate the principle of "fundamental
fairness" envisioned by the prophylactic due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment, general residuum authority under
the Indian Constitution is vested in the union government. 8
B.

The American "Due Process" Clause Versus the
Indian "ProcedureEstablished by Law" Provision

The nature of Indian federalism partly explains the relative
absence of judicial activism-so characteristic of the Supreme
Court of the United States-on problems relating to the criminal
process. Especially significant is the absence of the handy legal
formula of a due process clause 89 in the Indian Constitution;
for this concept, which has been employed by the Supreme Court
85.

INDIA CONsr. art. 217

(1950).

86. See notes 204-230, infra, and the accompanying discussion.
87. U.S. CONsr. amend. X. Under the Indian Constitution, no individual can claim
a fundamental right against the state outside the chapter on fundamental rights. This
precludes the chance of the Indian courts from inquiring about any fundamental right
that is not enumerated in the Constitution. This again is a restriction on the scope
of judicial review in India as against that in the United States where, under the guise
of a theory of natural rights, the judges may enlarge the scope of interpretation to
whatever extent they choose. See generally E. MCWHINNEY, JUDICIAL REv Ew 126-55 (4th
ed. 1969), originally entitled JUDICIAL RE IEw IN THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING WORLD.

88. INDIA CONSr. art. 248 (1950). In giving reserved powers to the central government, the Indian Constitution follows the Canadian model.
89. The Indian Constitution contains express provisions for judicial review of legislation (articles 32 and 226) as to its conformity with the Constitution, whereas in the
United States the Supreme Court has assumed extensive power of reviewing legislative
acts under the cover of the "due process" clause. U.S. CONSr. amend. V: "[N]or [shall
any person] be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . .. ."
(emphasis supplied). Originally, the Bill of Rights was applicable only in the federal
courts. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall stated in Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.)
243, 250 (1833): "These [eight] Amendments contain no expression indicating an intention
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of the United States as a constitutional reservoir of values,0J has
become an instrument of judicial activism, particularly in the
federalizing of the American criminal process.
Due process has been defined in terms of "general rules which
govern society,"' 1 and are "derived from considerations that
are fused in the whole nature of . . . [American] judicial process" 92 to insure "fair play."93 The crux of these attempts to
define "due process," tailored to the individual type of proceeding to which it is applied, seems to be an attempt to find a system
designed to prevent arbitrary encroachments, both substantive
and procedural, on fundamental rights. 94 It is not only a limitation on the federal government through the fifth amendment, but
also on various state governments through the fourteenth amendment.
Whether specific state action must meet the sometimes amorphous requirements of due process depends on the particular
theory used to test the activity in question. The absorption theory
incorporates the Bill of Rights-all of it, nothing more and
nothing less-into the fourteenth amendment." It is a theory much
to apply them to the state governments." Rather, they were intended only to limit
the federal government. Fourteen years later, in Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410,
434-35 (1847), Mr. Justice Daniel stated that the first eight amendments were "exclusively restrictions upon federal power, intended to prevent interference with the rights
of the States, and of their citizens ....
[S]uch indeed is the only rational and intelligible interpretation . . . since it is neither probable or credible that the States should
have anxiously insisted to ingraft upon the federal constitution restrictions upon their
own authority...." See also Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 124-25 (1959). However,
with the enactment of the fourteenth amendment in 1868, the argument was made
that the Bill of Rights applied to the states as well, through the due process clause.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968), reviewing the history of incorporation,
stated that many of the rights guaranteed by the first eight amendments are protected
against state action by operation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, which reads: "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law .... " (emphasis supplied).
90. See generally Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L.
REv. 1048 (1968).
91. Owens v. Battenfield, 33 F.2d 753, 756 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 605
(1929).
92. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952).
93. United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Ragen, 86 F. Supp. 382, 388 (N.D. II.
1949).
94. See generally L. HALL, Y. KAAlsAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL
PROcEDuRE 13-62 (3d rev. ed. 1969).
95. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 163 (1968) (Black, J., concurring); Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72, 89 (1947) (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting). Late Mr.
Justice Black's views were systematically developed in his Carpentier Lectures at the
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criticized." Of those now on the Court, only Mr. Justice Douglas
joined the late Mr. Justice Black in this uncompromising view of
incorporation. However, Mr. Justice Black had been content that,
in practical effect, his position had prevailed through the Court's

application of what it calls "selective incorporation."97 This doctrine, of recent origin, purportedly adheres to the Palko v. Con-

necticut"8 formulation; while not recognizing that an entire Bill of
Rights' guarantee is essential, the Twining v. New Jersey99 and

Columbia Law School. H. BLACK, A

CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1968). There is considerable
irony.in the history of the Black-Douglas "incorporation" doctrine. The doctrine originated in reaction against the Supreme Court's use of substantive due process concepts,
under both the fifth and fourteenth amendments, to invalidate economic and social legislation of both the states and Congress (see Ribnik v. McBridge, 277 U.S. 350 (1928);
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1928); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905)); thus its contemporary significance as a liberalizing element in the judicial
system is an astounding tour de force in the field of procedural due process.
96. While the late Mr. Justice Black had attempted to demonstrate that it was
the intention of the drafters of the fourteenth amendment to make the Bill of Rights
apply to the states, to cope with the imprecision of constitutional language, he at times
resorted to historical fictions or to verbal renderings which have appeared strained or
overparticularized to critics. See T. TAYLOR, Two STUDmEs IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
6, 12 (1969); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?
The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949); Kelly, Clio and the Court: An
Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Su. Cr. RFv. 119; Mendelson, Mr. Justice Black's Fourteenth
Amendment, 53 MINN. L. REv. 711 (1969); Mykkeltvedt, Justice Black and the Intentions
of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment's First Section: The Bill of Rights and
the States, 20 MERCER L. REv. 432 (1969); Mykkeltvedt, The Judicial Development of
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause-Preludeto the Selective Incorporation
of the Bill of Rights, 22 MERCER L. R.ev. 538 (1971). But see Crosskey, Charles Fairman,
"Legislative History," and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CmI.
L. REv. 1 (1954); and Fairman's rebuttal, A Reply to Professor Crosskey, id. at 144.
This Fairman-Crosskey debate is ably analyzed and the latter's defense of Justice Black's
dissent is supported with additional evidence in

Avins, Incorporation of the Bill of

Rights: The Crosskey.Fairman Debate Revisited, 6 HARV. J. LEGis. 1 (1968). See also
C. FAIRMAN & S. MoRmsoN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE
INCORPORATION THEORY (1970), which traces the development of the incorporation theory
by following it through two cases, Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1949) and
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 US. 145 (1968), and the Stanford Law Review article written
in 1949, and cited supra; C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE UsEs OF HISTORY

(1969).
97. The process is analyzed in Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth
Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963), written just before the Court made its major
breakthrough under the new doctrine in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Frankfurter, Memorandum on "Incorporation" of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 HARv. L. Rev. 746 (1965).
98. 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled, Benton v. Maryland, 395 US. 784, 794 (1969).
99. 211 US. 78 (1908). The Court concluded that the exemption from compulsory
self-incrimination is not a privilege or immunity of national citizenship guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment against abridgment by the states. The Court reasoned that
in order for a guarantee to be essential and to be included within the due process
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Palko standards' ° enabled the Court to utilize a technique which
allowed
it to particularize state infringements upon a specific
01
right. '
Commencing from a "natural-law-due process" base, the
fractionalization of specific Bill of Rights' protections was made
subject to the individual prejudices and predilections of different
justices and their evolving concepts of what rights are "fundamental" in different periods of history. 10' 2 The Bill of Rights does
provide a concrete positive basis for the rights protected under
the Constitution, but it should not obscure the fact that a number
of the formulations set forth in the first eight amendments to the
Constitution are generally indeterminate and thus encourage
great latitude for judicial subjectivity in their construction. This
subjective method of interpreting due process, elusive in itself,
has not only prevented total-incorporation 10 3 but has resulted in
clause, it must affirmatively meet the standard established: "Is . . . [the right] a fundamental principle of liberty and justice which inheres in the very idea of free government . . . ?" Id. at 106. The Court concluded that exemption from self-incrimination
was not an essential part of due process of law, and, thus, left the door open for
incorporation of other selected rights by stating that "it is possible that some of the
personal rights safeguarded by the first eight amendments [of the Bill of Rights] against
National action may also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them
would be a denial of due process of law." Id. at 99.
100. The Twining doctrine that none of the Bill of Rights provisions were incorporated into the fourteenth amendment was modified by dicta in Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937), overruled, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
In delineating the rights which should be incorporated into the fourteenth amendment,
the Court differentiated between rights which are fundamental to individual liberty
when weighed against the mandates of the Constitution, and those which are not. Under
the Palko doctrine, by a selective process of absorption, certain privileges and immunities from the earlier articles of the federal Bill of Rights have been brought
within the fourteenth amendment because of the belief that neither liberty nor justice
would exist if they were sacrificed. Id. Any right given under the Bill of Rights cannot
and should not be mandatory upon the states unless they are "of the very essence
of a scheme of ordered liberty." Id. at 325. The Court went on to say that to "abolish
them is not to violate a 'principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."' Id.
101. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947):
If the choice must be between the selective process of the Palko decision applying some of the Bill of Rights to the States, or the Twining rule applying none
of them, I would choose the Palko selective process. But rather than accept either
of these choices, I would follow what I believe was the original purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment-to extend to all people of the nation the complete
protection of the Bill of Rights.
Id. at 89 (Black, J., dissenting).
102. "It is becoming increasingly apparent ...
that the judicial concept of due
process, like beauty, 'is in the eyes of the beholder.' " United States ex rel. Butler v.
Maroney, 319 F.2d 622, 629 (3d Cir. 1963) (dissenting opinion).
103. No majority of the Court has ever genuinely endorsed the incorporation doctrine of justices Black and Douglas. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 174 (1968)
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the fractionalization of specific rights. Within the Supreme Court
today, there exists continuing dissent on selective incorporation.
The opponents do not want any form of absorption or incorporation, believing that the fourteenth amendment does not incorporate any of the Bill of Rights.0 Increasingly liberal standards
0
have emerged from this interplay of thought.o'
Another theory, even more alert to governmental transgressions on individual freedoms, stipulates that, in addition to
ivhat is specifically guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, individual
states cannot infringe rights that fall within the "penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them
life and substance."I"
Perhaps, tempted by this evolutionary potential of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause protecting manifold rights
of the accused in the United States, the framers of India's new
Constitution of 1950 tried to implant this clause in an article
reading: "No person shall be deprived of his life, or liberty,
without due process of law.... ,

While most of the members

of the Constituent Assembly favored the proposal of the Advisory
(Harlan & Stewart, JJ., dissenting). The most accurate characterization of the Court's
actual approach is perhaps that summarized by Justice White-that in developing the
procedural due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment, "the Court has
looked increasingly to the Bill of Rights for guidance .... ." Id. at 148. See Richter,
One Hundred Years of Controversy: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights,
15 LoYoLA L. REV. 281 (1969).
104. A formidable opponent of Mr. Justice Black's theory of full incorporation,
Mr. Justice Harlan states:
"Selective" incorporation or "absorption" amounts to little more than a diluted
form of the full incorporation theory. Whereas it rejects full incorporation because
of recognition that not all of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights should be
deemed "fundamental," it at the same time ignores the possibility that not all
phases of any given guaranty described in the Bill of Rights are necessarily
fundamental.
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 409 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). In Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (dealing with a right to trial by jury), Justice Harlan
further criticized selective incorporation. See generally THE EVOLUTION OF A JUDICIAL
PHILOSOPHY-SELECTED OPINIONS AND PAPERS OF JUSTICE JOHN M. HARLAN (D. Shapiro ed.

1969); Ledbetter, Mr. Justice Harlan: Due Process and Civil Liberties, 20 S.C.L. REV.
389 (1968).
105. See note 122 infra, and the accompanying discussion.
106. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). Professor Paul Kauper
discusses how this theory has "accordian-like qualities," capable of embracing any asserted right that might appeal to a majority of the Court. Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64
MICH. L. REV. 235 (1965). See also Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional
Charterfor an Expanded Law of Privacy, 64 MICH. L. REv. 197 (1965).
107. 3 CONSTITUENT AssEIMBLY DEBATES 426 (1947) [hereinafter cited as C.A.D.].
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Committee on Fundamental Rights,108 certain members vehemently opposed its adoption.10 In this context, it is a relatively
obscure fact that it was Mr. Justice Frankfurter's advice which
was responsible for the absence of a due process clause in the
Indian Constitution.1 " Sir Benegal N. Rau, deputized by the
President of the Constituent Assembly, visited the United States,
Canada, Eire and England in the early months following independence for personal discussions with prominent constitutionalists and jurists about the trouble-brewing features of India's
draft Constitution. Immediately after his conversations with Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, who opposed the inclusion of a due process
clause on the ground that that rubric had been used in America
to defeat social legislation, Sir Rau rushed a letter to the President
of the Constituent Assembly urging the elimination of the
clause."' Sir Rau's idealizing espousal of Mr. Justice Frankfurt108. An excursion into the Constituent Assembly Debates discloses acrimonious
debate over the wisdom of the adoption of this clause. 7 C.A.D. 842-59, 999-1001. See
generally D. BANERJEE, OUR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 210-14 (2d rev. ed. 1968).
109. One of the most prominent Constitution-makers, Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy Aiyer
remarked in the Constituent Assembly that the Drafting Committee thought that the
adoption of the Japanese "procedure established by law" instead of the American clause
would afford protection "against judicial vagaries." 2 C.A.D. 209.
110. Surprisingly, even a most searching work by Justice William 0. Douglas, Bill
of Rights, Due Process, and Federalism in India, 40 MINN. L. Rny. 1, 13-14 (1955),
has missed the unusually significant contribution of his learned colleague. Frankfurter's
scepticism over the "due process" clause is neatly summed up by an Israeli scholar:
[W]hen teaching at Harvard, Frankfurter used to insist that the due process clause

was meant originally as a purely procedural safeguard and that the substantive
meanings given to it by successive generations of lawyers lacked justification. His
real attitude toward the clause came out during a visit which this writer paid
him, a few years before his retirement from the Supreme Court. "Do you have
a due process clause in Israel?" asked the Justice. Upon my explaining that,
in the absence of a formal constitution, Israel has no constitutional provision of

that import, but that Israel's judges try to read into their country's statutes and
regulations some restraints akin to "due process"

which they attribute to

the common law or to natural justice, Frankfurter replied with feeling: "Well,
when you write a constitution, for God's sake don't put into it a due process
clausel"
Adzin, Felix Frankfurter-inMemoriam, 2 Is. L. REv. 299, 307-08 (1967).
111. See B. RAu, INDIA'S CONSTTUTION IN THE MAKING (2d rev. ed., B. Shiva Rao
ed. 1963):
Justice Frankfurter considered that the power of judicial review implied
in the due process clause, of which there is a qualified version in . . . India's draft
Constitution, is not only undemocratic (because it gives a few judges the power
of vetoing legislation enacted by the representatives of the nation) but also throws
an unfair burden on the judiciary ....
Id. at 328-29. K. M. Munshi, one of the chief architects of India's Constitution, also
recounts the influence of Justice Frankfurter toward the elimination of "due process"
clause in 1 K. MUNSHI, INrAN CONSrn-UmONAL DOCUMENTS-PILGRIMAGE TO FREEDOM 298-99
(1967).

"LAW AND ORDER"

er's constitutional common sense"12 induced the Drafting Committee to reopen the dialogue. They substituted the Japanese
expression "procedure established by law" for the words "due
process of law," calling the former more specific as opposed to
the infinite reservoir of values embodied in the latter. 13
Notwithstanding this historical background of the Constituent Assembly's deliberate rejection of the due process language,
it was contended in Gopalan v. Madras'1 4 that the Indian Constitution gives the same protection to every person in India as the
United States Constitution gives to persons in America with the
exception being that, while in the United States "due process of
law" was construed by the Supreme Court to cover both substantive and procedural law, only the protection of procedural law
is guaranteed in India. In other words, the expression "procedure
established by law," appearing in article 21,115 was but a paraphrase of the procedural "due process of law" in the Constitution
of the United States. The Indian Supreme Court (majority)
ruled that the term "law" was used here in the sense of statute
law. This was not equivalent to "law" in the abstract or general
sense, embodying principles of natural justice recognized by
112. There can be no better evidence to corroborate this change than the comment
LAw AND LIFE & OTHER THINGS
THAT MATTER 128 (1965): "There is no such provision [due process of law] in the

made by the self-effacing Frankfurter himself in his OF

Indian Constitution, which was the product of careful study by that very distinguished
jurist of India, Sir Benegal Rau, who . . . [studied] how our [American] scheme of
things works, and then recommended against inclusion of such a restriction upon the
states of India." A similar reference occurs in an earlier writing of Frankfurter:
Much as the constitution makers of other countries have drawn upon our
experience, it is precisely because they have drawn upon it that they have, one
and all, abstained from including a "due process" clause. They have rejected it
in conspicuous instances after thorough consideration of our judicial history of
"due process.". . . It is particularly noteworthy that such was the course of
events in framing the constitution of India. Sir B. N. Rau, one of the most
penetrating legal minds of our time, had a major share in its drafting, and for
the purpose he made a deep study of the workings of the Due Process Clause
during an extensive stay here.
Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARv. L. REv. 217, 232 (1955),
in GOVERNMENT UNDER LAw 6, 24 (A. Sutherland ed. 1956, reissued by Da Capo Press,

New York, 1968), in J. THAYER, 0.

HOLMES & F. FRANKFURTER, JOHN MARSHALL

135,

163 (Phoenix ed. 1967), in FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT 533, 551 (P.
Kurland ed. 1970).
113. 7 C.A.D. 844. The Drafting Committee also qualified the word "liberty" by
adding "personal," presumably to make it clear that the fundamental rights of freedom
of movement in article 19 (1) (d) and of personal liberty in article 21 should be
separately treated.
114. All India Rptr. [1950] S.C. 27.
115. INDIA CONSr. art. 21 (1950) : "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal
liberty except according to procedure established by law."
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civilized systems of jurisprudence through which the Court was
to test procedural requirements."" It guaranteed only that whatever procedure was prescribed by a legislature must be properly
observed. So long as procedural rights-the manner and form of
enforcing the law-are kept within the framework of permissible
legislation, they cannot be declared invalid on the grounds of
unreasonableness.
Mr. Justice Fazl-i-Ali, dissenting, held that the principle
"that no person can be condemned without a hearing by an
impartial tribunal which is well-recognized in all modern civilized systems of law and which Halsbury puts on a par with wellrecognized fundamental right" 7 is implicit in the language of
article 21. "'[P]rocedure established by law' must include this
principle, whatever else it may or may not include."" 8 The
learned Justice explained that "on account of the very elastic
meaning given to [the American expression due process of law],
the Indian Constituent Assembly preferred to use the words 'according to procedure established by law' which occur in the
Japanese Constitution framed in 1946."1 9 The history and background of Japan's new Constitution convinced the learned Justice that the phrase "procedure established by law" was there
meant to guarantee "what is expressed by certain American writers by the somewhat quaint but useful expression 'procedural
due process.' "1'0 "Procedural due process," then, he argued
should be read into article 21 of the Indian Constitution. Justice Fazl-i-Ali further recognized that the line between procedural and substantive due process was at best tenuous.
The then Justice Patanjali Sastri, while agreeing with the
majority that the principles of natural justice were too elusive
to be susceptible of precise judicial formulation and that the use
of the word "established" in article 21-implying some degree of
firmness, permanence and general acceptance-would indicate
that the framers of the Indian Constitution did not intend to
leave the right so vague, did not rule that "procedure estab116. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and
Criticism, 66 YALE LJ.319 (1957).
117. All India Rptr. [1950] S.C. at 60.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 57.
120. Id.
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lished by law" would mean any procedure whatsoever laid down
by state-made law. In an effort to strike a rapprochement between
the two extreme positions, the learned Justice interpreted the
article as guaranteeing "'the ordinary and well-established criminal procedure,' that is to say, those settled usages and normal
modes of proceeding sanctioned by the Criminal Procedure
Code . . . in the country.' 121 This construction reads into the
words "procedure established by law" the words "existing procedure under the Criminal Procedure Code." Since the legislature has the power to amend or abrogate the Code, however,
the mesne interpretation appears untenable. To the objections
that his view of article 21 provided only ephemeral protection,
Justice Patanjali Sastri replied that although an ad hoc procedure
could not be devised by a special law, the fundamental principles underlying the Code could be abrogated altogether for the
trial of all offenses. Such a conclusion, it is submitted, is neither
supported by the text of article 21 nor by any principle of construction.
Thus, while over the years the Supreme Court of the United
States has been developing a criminal jurisprudence of sophisticated and exacting requirements, from the fourteenth amendment's broad guarantee of due process, 2 2 the Indian expressioii,
121. Id. at 74.
122. The fourteenth amendment requires the states to accord due process of law to
all persons within their jurisdictions and the Court has looked increasingly to the Bill of
Rights for interpretive guidance in giving content to the constitutionally-imposed obligation. While the Supreme Court has rejected the theory of absolute incorporation.
it was held that through the fourteenth amendment certain of the "fundamental rights"
of the first eight amendments place limitations upon state as well as federal exercise of
power.
By this selective process of absorption or incorporation, the guarantees applicable to
state criminal proceedings are: the fourth amendment rights to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures and to have excluded any evidence illegally seized (Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961), Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); the right guaranteed by
the fifth amendment to be free of compelled self-incrimination (Malloy v. Hogan, 378 US.
1 (1964), Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965)); and double jeopardy (Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)); the sixth amendment rights to counsel (Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)), Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)), to a speedy
trial (Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967)), and public trial (In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257 (1948)), to an impartial jury if one is required (Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S.
717 (1961)), to a jury trial in criminal cases (Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)),
to confrontation of opposing witnesses (Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)), and to
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses (Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967));
and the eighth amendment guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment (Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)). That the incorporated guarantees would place the
same restrictions on the states as on the federal government was made explicit in
Malloy, supra.
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"procedure established by law," has not offered a parallel mechanism for the steady growth of such penumbral values-not
suggested by the language of the Constitution-necessary to reflect changing needs, concerns and aspirations. The Indian Constitution, in setting forth not merely a set of rights comparable to
the first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United
States but in enumerating with detail much that the United
States document left unwritten, has encouraged stricter construction. During the first twenty-one years of the working of the Constitution, the Indian courts while readily interfering in proper
cases and granting relief, have, on the whole, not been very creative in balancing the interest of the individual against that of
the state.
It should be .pointed out that Gopalan's interpretation, that
all article 21 requires is that there should be a law justifying
governmental deprivation of the individual's life or liberty, is
unduly procrustean, giving rise to such "lurid" misgivings as that
this article permits boiling or torturing a person to death and that
trial by battle or ordeal can be constitutionally prescribed by
the legislatures in India.? 4 If that were so, then, as Professor
P. K. Tripathi has perceptively argued, 2 the article should
have read: "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal
liberty except according to law." Instead, the article reads: "No
person ,shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except
according to procedure established by law." The difference is
crucial. Article 21, understood in its natural and grammatical
sense, requires two conditions: first, there must be a law prescribing a procedure; and, second, the procedure so prescribed must
be followed. True, the requirement of a procedure is not co123. The due process clause in the fourteenth amendment has been given a broad
.definition at least in part because there is no long list of specific prohibitions upon
the states as in the first eight amendments vis-h-vis the federal government. Qualifications such as "reasonableness" regarding constitutional provisions, have in some instances provided judges with considerable room to exercise their discretion. In the
Indian Constitution, the attempt has been to weave into the provisions relating to
"Right to Freedom," the whole of American law regarding "police powers" and "due
process" with suitable modification for Indian conditions, instead of leaving judges free
to make decisions according to their own personal notions of what is just and reasonable
at the moment. See G. JOSHI, ASPECTS OF INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 95-98 (1965). See
also Grossman, Freedom of Expression in India, 4 U.C.L.A.L. Rxv. 64, 65 (1956).
124. See, e.g., A. GLEDHILL, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ININIA 83 (1956).
125. Tripathi, Mr. Justice Gajendragadkarand Constitutional Interpretation, 8 J.
IND. L. INsT. 479, 502-03 (1969), in SPOTLIGHTs ON CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 1, 22-23

(1971).
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extensive with any elaborate or even just procedure. However,
it is by no means semantic suicide to argue that what is required
must be procedure and not something like the exercise of authority by a victorious military commander over a vanquished territory.
The Gopalan Court in scrutinizing the phrase "procedure
established by law" did not fully appreciate that the substitution
of this more specific phrase for the American analogue, "due
process of law," was made with the intention of delimiting the
judiciary's subjective standard of review rather than with the
purpose of permitting the legislature to disregard the meaning of
the word "procedure" as defined through the centuries of development of the Indian common law. The history of personal liberty
is "largely . . .the history of ... procedural safeguards,"' ' and
the framers of the Indian Constitution could have hardly desired
to dispense, in article 21, with fundamental procedural protections
which are "of the indispensable essence of liberty." ' The constitutional requirement as to the minimum safeguards the procedure must embody, is, in fact, to be found in article 22, 8
both for normal situations of social life and for those extraordinary situations where normal procedure could be regarded as inadequate to combat lawlessness. The words "right to consult and
be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice," appearing in
article 22 (1), are broad enough to comprehend necessary protections-in an adversary system-that an accused may need during the course of procedures for punitive or preventive detention. No democratic society can endure if oppressive measures
are justified by pleading the worthiness of the ends sought. To
126.
127.

McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.. 206,224 (1953)

(Jackson, J.,

dissenting).
128. INDIA CONSr. art. 22 (1950):
(1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being in-

formed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied
the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice.
(2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced
before the nearest magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such arrest
excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the court

of the magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said
period without the authority of a magistrate.

(3) Nothing in clauses (1)and (2) shall apply(a) to any person who for the time being is an enemy alien; or
(b)

to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing
for preventive detention.
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construe "procedure" to include revolting, brutalized atrocities
is to subvert the right to life and personal liberty; so construed,
article 21 would confer on the state a fundamental right to take
'away life or liberty. Further, it is common sense that one provision of the Constitution would not authorize the circumvention of the others. True, it is neither likely that Parliament would
enact such monstrous laws nor, in the ultimate analysis, would
an intelligent electorate tolerate such perverse tyranny. Nonetheless, the ideal underlying fundamental rights is that there is
in India a government with limited powers. Thus, the guarantees of articles 14 (equal protection), 19 (freedom of speech, etc.),
20 (protection against ex post facto laws, double jeopardy, selfincrimination) and 22 (protection against arrest and detention)
must be considered to be subsumed within the meaning of procedure in article 21. If the legislature can conceive of a "trial
by battle or ordeal" in which the accused is provided with counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination and the right of confrontation, etc., let them construct such a system. But it is submitted that the term "procedure" has assumed connotations in
India which extend beyond the minimum guarantees of the fund(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorize the detention of a
person for a longer period than three months unless(a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are, or have been,
or are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of a High Court has
reported before the expiration of the said period of three months
that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention:
Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall authorize the
detention of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed
by any law made by Parliament under sub-clause (b) of clause (7); or
(b) such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of
any law made by Parliament under sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (7).
(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law
providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon
as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been
made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation
against the order.
(6) Nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority making any such order
as is referred to in that clause to disclose facts which such authority considers
to be against the public interest to disclose.
(7)

Parliament may by law prescribe(a) the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of cases
in which, a person may be detained for a period longer than three
months under any law providing for preventive detention without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board in accordance with the provisions
of sub-clause (a) of clause (4);
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amental rights and which would vitiate the legislative creation
of such a farcical facade. 2 9 Therefore, procedure, in article 21
cannot mean a procedure which runs counter to the Indian jurisprudential tradition. Otherwise, since the procedural safeguards contained in article 22 will be available only in cases
of preventive and punitive detention, the right to life, the right
to privacy and the right to travel will not be protected by any
procedural safeguard. 130

(b) the maximum period for which any person may in any class or
classes of cases be detained under any law providing for preventive
detention; and
(c) the procedure to be followed by an Advisory Board in an inquiry
under sub-clause (a) of clause (4).

129. But see A.

GLEDHiLL,

supra note 124.

130. However, since the Gopalan case in 1960, the Court's attitude has gradually
changed relating both to the scope and content of the expression "personal liberty" and to
the view that "personal liberty" could be taken away or abridged by any law passed
by a legislature, however arbitrary or unreasonable. The majority of the Court in
Kharak Singh v. State, All India Rptr. [1963] S.C. 1295, construed the expression "personal liberty" as a "compendious term to include within itself all the varieties of rights
which go to make up the. . . several clauses of Art. 19(1)." Id. at 1302. The Court
was dealing with a case of intrusion into the privacy of a person's home by the government.
The Court displayed remarkable creativity by reading into "personal liberty" the
right to privacy, which the Constituent Assembly had expressly refused to protect by
rejecting an amendment to the effect that "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, homes, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated ....
'7 C.A.D. 842. The Court noted that, unlike the American Constitution, the
Indian Constitution does not guarantee the right to privacy. All India Rptr. [1963] S.C. at
1302. And yet, relying on Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 142 (1876), the Court held that
an unauthorized intrusion into a person's home and the disturbance caused to
him thereby, is as it were the violation of a common law right of a man-an
ultimate essential of ordered liberty, if not of the very concept of civilization.
An English common law maxim asserts that 'every man's house is his castle'
and in Semayne's case . .. where this was applied, it was stated that 'the house
of everyone is to him as his castle and fortress as well as for his defence against
injury and violence as for his repose.'
All India Rptr. [1963] S.C. at 1302. See also Satvant Singh Sawhney v. Assistant
Passport Officer, All India Rptr. [1967] S.C. 1836.
But, however wide the connotation given to the words "personal liberty," how would
it avail the citizen if it was to be open to the legislature by any arbitrary or
unreasonable law to deprive him of it? The subjection of personal liberty to the tyranny
of the legislature brought about by the early decision of the Supreme Court still remains.
However, later decisions have tended to remedy this erosion of the individual's rights by
taking the view that the word "law" in article 21 must mean a valid law or a law
which in all manner conforms to the provisions of the Constitution. A law would not
be a valid law if it imposes restrictions on personal liberty which are not reasonable
or in the public interest. All lovers of personal liberty hope that the Supreme Court
will at no distant date authoritatively adopt this view. As the law would seem to
stand at present, the precious rights of life and personal liberty, though safeguarded
against the vagaries of the executive branch, are entirely at the mercy of the legislature.
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C. The Sacrosanctity of the Jury Trial
Trial by jury, one of the most sacred concepts of British""'
and American18 2 law, has been abandoned in India as a failure.
Although, in recent years, a number of scholarly studies08 have
seriously questioned the efficaci of jury trials, the jury is a part
of the credo of the American legal system. The remarkable acclimatization and flourishing of the jury system in the United
States 34 must be viewed against the historical background of its
importation.'8 5
131. For a very instructive description of the institution of jury trial in England and
its problems see W., CoRNsH, THE JURY (1968); P. DEVuN, TRIAL BY JURY (1956).

Recent accounts of the origins of jury trial discussing the views of earlier historians are
J. DAWSON, A HsTORY OF LAY JUDGES 118-20 (1962); D. STN'tON, ENaGUSH JUSTICE, 1066-

1215, at 13-21 (1964).
I 132. The United States is now the established leader in objective studies of the jury
system. All earlier investigations have now been dwarfed by the researches of the

Chicago Jury Project. For fifteen years a team of lawyers, psychologists and sociologists
at the University of Chicago has been working with judges and court officials throughout the United States on a number of different studies. Their series of projects will,
when finally reported in full, provide a body of knowledge quite unparalleled In scale
and depth. For a complete bibliography of the publications setting out Jury Project
findings as of March, 1966, see H. KALvEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 541-45
(1966). See also Erlanger, Jury Research in America: Its Past and Future, 4 LAW &
Soc. REv. 345 (1970); Zeisel, Dr. Spock and the Case of the Vanishing Women Jurors,
37 U. CHI.L. REv. 1 (1969).
133. J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL chs. 8-9 (1963); G. WILLIAMS, THE PROOF or GUILT
ch. 10 (3d ed. 1963). For a summary of the debate over the strengths and weaknesses of the jury system, see H. KALVEN & H. ZEISrL, supra note 132 at 7-11. The
authors, cognizant of the debate over the jury system, disclaim making any value
jutdgment. Rather, they attempt to provide some facts and conclusions in a limited area
to enable debaters to move from the level of emotion, speculation, and a priori guesses to
a level of fact. "[The Book's] single purpose is to attempt to answer the question when
do trial by judge and trial by jury lead to divergent results." Id. at 9-10. See also Broeder,
The Functionsof the Jury, 21 U. CHI. L. RaY. 385, 390 (1954); R. SIMON, Tim JURY AND TM
DEFENSE OF INSANITY 4-8 (1967).
134. "Juries are ... used much more frequently in America than in England....
[I]t has recently been estimated that some 80 percent of all criminal jury trials In
the world take place in the United States." W. CORNISH, supra note 131, at 16.
135. See generally A. HOWARD, THE RoAD FRoas RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMmcA (1968); White, Origin and Development of Trial by Jury,
29 TENN. L. REV. 8 (1961). In support of its ruling in Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 US. 145 (1968), that trial by jury is protected by the fourteenth amendment against
state deprivation in any case that would come within the sixth amendment's guarantee
if tried in a federal court, the Court remarked that the impressive credentials of jury
trial in criminal cases have been traced "by many" to the Magna Carta, but added,
"Historians no longer accept this pedigree." Id. at 151 n.16. The Magna Carta as the
talismanic symbol of the liberty of the individual has always been considered to be more
than what it really was. Yet the Court would have been more accurate if it had
added that although the famous "judgment of peers" clause of the document of 1215,
chapter thirty-nine, did not originally mean trial by jury, its meaning has evolved to
require precisely that. See also SOURCES OF OUR LBERTiEs 270 (R. Perry ed. 1959).
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To the English colonists who migrated to America the right
to trial by jury was the safest and surest bulwark against the
tyranny of the sovereign state, for they won independence at a
time when the jury system was being generally acclaimed as a
fundamental guarantee of individual liberty. Prominent in their
list of grievances against King George III, as set forth in the
Declaration of Independence, was the fact that they were being
deprived of this right of trial by jury. The battle of the so-called
common man, who had suffered for centuries under the tyranny
of despotic kings, to secure the protection of his individual
rights to life, liberty and property had been dearly fought. It
was understandable, then, that he should cling to these precious
rights after fighting a war to secure them.
When the American Revolutionary War was over, trial by
jury in all criminal matters was thus enshrined as a constitutional right: the right is guaranteed in the federal courts by
article III of the Constitution and reinforced by the sixth amendment.1 36 Not only is trial by jury guaranteed in the constitutions of the federation and the states, but various important
changes have been made in the system itself, most of which are
designed to limit the powers of the judge and thus to retain the
vitality of this cherished right. The scope of the right was 6riginally the same as that found in England in 17891" but has since
been periodically expanded by the Supreme Court. 138 It was only
in 1968 that the Court declared that the sixth amendment right
to a jury trial is fundamental and extended it to the states, presumably with the entire crust of interpretation developed in federal cases.129 And, in 1970, in Baldwin v. New York, 4 ' the Court
136.

US. CONSr. art. III, § 2: "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Im-

peachment, shall be by Jury; ...
US. CONST. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury .... "
137. American juries differ substantially in their constitution and duties from their
English counterparts. F. BuscH, LAW AND TAcTics IN JURY TUALs (1949); Hood, Recent

Developments: Trial by Jury, 20 AtA. L. REv. 76 (1967).
138. See, e.g., Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930); Capital Traction Co. v.
Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899); Thompson v. Utah, 170 US. 343 (1898).
139. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 US. 145 (1968); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co.,
391 US. 216 (1968); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 'US. 194 (1968). See generally Pollock, Due
Process and Jury Trials in State Courts, 10 Aaiz. L. REv. 492 (1968); Note, Trial
by Jury in Criminal Cases, 69 COLUM. L. Rev. 419 (1969); Note, Disposition of Witherspoon-Type Cases, 30 LA. L. REv. 502 (1970).
140. 399 US. 66 (1970); Note, j.ry Trial in Criminal Prosecutions: "Freedom
Lives," 45 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 324 (1970).
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-expanded the right to a trial by jury to all those accused of
"petty" offenses, where the penalty may be more than six months
1 41
imprisonment. But the scope of the right in the state courts
is far from standardized, although its existence is universally
Tecognized among them. Notwithstanding minor modifications
and limitations by the states, Americans have continued to regard
jury trials in criminal cases as the great bulwark of the liberty of
he citizen.
The exportation of the right to jury trial 42 was not a significant factor in the development of the legal systems in other
British colonies like India. 143 Traces of the jury trial in India
are available as early as 1672144 or even before, as one scholar has
141. The states limit the right in a number of ways; e.g., five-man juries, no requirement of unanimity. See generally ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JuSTIcE, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY 8 (rent. Draft 1968).
142. In the ancient judicial system of India trial by jury existed but not in the
same form as it is understood now. In the court scene of Mrichchhaakatika (an Indian
play), which according to Jayaswal is the product of the third century, jury is mentioned.
K. JAYASWAL, HINDU POLITY 54 (1953). Certain people could claim to be tried by their
peers or at least by a jury. See generally 3 P. KANE, HISTORY OF DHARMASASTRA 284 (1916).
These members of the community were merely the examiners of the cause of conflict and
assisted the presiding judge in the administration of justice.
Before the advent of the British, the institution of panchayat, similar in certain
respects to that of a jury, was in vogue. It consisted of five members nominated
by both the disputing parties, each party nominating two, and the four so nominated appointing a fifth who roughly corresponded to the foreman. The belief was
that a decision of five men was as good as the decision of the Almighty-and so was
infallible. However, jury and the panchayat differed fundamentally in origin and character. The former developed from the Royal inquest which was a mode of obtaining
information required by the king or his government. The panchayat, on the other hand,
was a people's institution, serving local needs including the administration of justice and
the policing of the village.
143. Surprisingly, no mention is made of trial by jury in India by Seagle in his
otherwise excellent seminal survey of Jury: Other Countries, 8 ENCYC. SoC. Sea. 498

(1937).
144. Until 1661, when Bombay became British territory by cession under Charles
11's marriage treaty with Portugal, responsibility for the administration of justice to Indians was not contemplated. The charter of Charles II in 1668, leasing Bombay to the
East India Company, empowered the Company, inter alia, to make laws and set up law
courts in the newly-acquired British possession "consonant to reason, and not repugnant
to, but as near as might be agreeable to the laws of England." W. MoRLEY, TIlE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN BRITISH INDIA 5-6 (1858); Sharma, Civil Law in India,
1969 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 3. There is scant information about the administration of criminal
justice during this period. But the correspondence between Bombay and Surat, where the
factory of the Company was situated and where the Governor resided, contains references
to the trial by jury of crimes like theft, murder and mutiny. The Governor's instructions
dealing with a case of mutiny by soldiers are interesting:
For the tryall of those notorious mutiners that tore the proclamation and
opposed the execution of justice on the wench you caused to be shaved and sett
on an ass, lett a jury be empannelled whom if they find guilty of mutiny,
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suggested, 145 but it was only with the enactment of the Code of
Criminal Procedure that statutory recognition was given to trial
by jury. 46 The right was -confined to presidency towns where the
high courts exercised original criminal jurisdiction, and it depended entirely on the government of each province to decide in
what areas of the province and for what offenses trial by jury
should be introduced.
When the Constitution was framed in 1950, the Constitution-makers did not think it appropriate to confer on the citizen
in the Bill of Rights a fundamental right to trial by jury. A Law
Commission survey of the legal system revealed that jury trial
had not been adopted in much of the country, that its utilization
even in areas where it had been adopted was limited to certain
classes of offenses, and that some sectors of the country originally
providing jury trials had decided to discontinue doing so.14
And, in the latter areas, there had been few public complaints
when trial by jury was eliminated by state legislatures. The Commission concluded that,
though the system of trial by jury was introduced in some parts
of the country over a hundred years ago, the system has never
become a recognized feature of the administration of criminal

justice. Trial by jury in India to the extent it exists today is but
a transplantation of a practice prevailing in England which has
failed to grow and take root in this country.14s
lett them be sentenced, condemned, and executed according to the 3rd Article of
the Hon. Company's laws for the preservation of the peace and suppression of
mutiny, sedition and Rebellion.
Surat letter of 16 May 1672, reproduced by P. MAI.ABARI, BOMBAY IN THE MAKING 250
(1910). A more interesting case is that of the trial of a wizard who "was by a jury of 12
To the last we intended to have
men found guilty both of witchcraft and murder....
hanged him; only it was generally advised that burning would be far the greater terrour,
as also that a single wizard deserving hanging, whereas he had now murthered 5 men in
6 months andhad bin twice banished before for a wizard, soe we burnt him." 105 F.R. SuRAT
172. See generally C. FAwcr, THE Fsr CENTURY OF BRITISH JUSTICE IN INDIA (1934).
145. V. KULSHRESHTHA, LANDMARKS IN INDIAN LEGAL HISTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY 46 (2d rev. ed. 1968), mentions a 1665 jury trial in Madras although most

of the standard works -on Indian legal history are of the view that jury trial in
Madras began sometime in 1678.
146. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1862. For a description of several Regulations before the Code, introducing jury trial in various parts of the country, see T. BANERJEE,
LAW 268-77 (1963).
LAw Cosm'mN OF INDIA, REP'T No. 14, REFORM OF JuDIcrIAL ADMINISTRATION 864-

BACKGROUND TO INDIAN CRIMINAL

147.

73 (1958). There is a mass of opinion and evidence in the REPORT ON THE SYSTEM
OF TRIAL BY JURY IN COURTS OF SESSION IN THE MOFASSAL (Home Department Publication
No. CCCLXVI at Calcutta in 1899). Pages 229-55 contain the report of a commission
appointed to inquire into jury trial in Bengal.
148. LAW COMM'N OF INDIA, supra note 147, at 866; Gill, Abolish Jury System, All
Indian Rptr. [1959] Journal Section 140.
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The Commission recommended the abandonment of juries on
an all-India basis, concluding that because, among other things,
bribery of jurors was so widespread the jury system had become
a time-consuming and expensive failure.14 For all intents and
purposes, since 1955 Indian cases have been tried exclusively by
the judiciary except in the three urban areas of Bombay, Calcutta,
and Madras where the jury system remains in partial operation
due to unexplained local public support. This use of a virtually jury-free trial system takes on added significance when it is
remembered that the legal system in India was, like the American
system, strongly influenced by British common law principles.
As a result of the general disuse of the jury system, several
problems usually associated with jury trials, 150 especially in the
area of the protection of the rights of the defendant, are happily
absent in the Indian legal system-problems which transcend
some of the unique safeguards which the jury system provides.
In the United States, many jurors readily admit in posttrial interviews that they were unable to remember adequately the evidence presented or to comprehend sufficiently the instructions of
the court. 51 Particularly damaging to defendants is the failure
of many jurors to understand general instructions regarding the
prosecutor's burden of proof. A question arises as to whether the
implementation of a nonjury system in the United States would
improve the effectiveness of her legal system. 52 Although this
change would bury a long-held tradition of a "trial by peers,"
it would also eliminate the time and expense involved in voir dire
examinations and jury sequestrations as well as in retrials due to
149. LAW COMM'N OF INDIA, supra note 147, at 873. See also, M. GLEISSER, JURIES AND
JusTrcE 57-58 (1968); Mawer, Juries and Assessors in Criminal Trials in Some Commonwealth Countries, 10 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 892 (1961).
150. For a succinct summation of these problems as reflected in three recent decisions
of the Supreme Court-Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) -see Note,
Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases, 69 COLUm. L. Rxv. 419 (1969). The proposals to
improve the operation of jury system recommended by ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUm STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL By JURY (Tent. Draft 1968)
are particularly significant; they are analyzed in Belli, Book Review, 68 NfIcIi. L. Ri;v. 614
(1970).
151. Smith, Orthodoxy v. Reformation in the Jury System-A Resolution, 51 JUDIcxAruan 344, 345 (1968). The jurors often complain that charges are unnecessarily long,
repetitious, and full of technical legal terms and Latinate expressions. Id.
152. Walsh, Testimony of William F. Walsh Before the Sub-Committee on Improve.
ments in the Judicial Machinery of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
5 Am. CRiM. L.Q. 193 (1967).
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hung juries and in cases remanded for jury prejudice. The general attitude of reverence toward the jury system in the United
States, if sound, is not based on any universal conception of basic
rights or on the belief that a jury is essential to some intrinsic
notion of a fair trial but rather because it is rooted deeply in
American historical, tradition.158

III.

A

RANDOM ILLUSTRATION"'

4

FOR COMPARISON:

THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

In assessing the relevance of the American constitutionalcriminal procedure as a guidepost for India's jurisprudential development, these three fundamental and historically-grounded institutional distinctions between the legal systems of the two nations-the differing structures of federalism, the interpretation
of "due process" as it defines the judicial role, and the relative
importance of the jury trial-must constantly be kept in mind,
if the trap of mindless imitation, which would benefit no one,
is to be avoided. These differences, operating as limitations upon
the efficacy of the comparative technique, account for the fact
that though the constitutions of both the countries provide certain rights the degree and scope of protection accorded by each
is not the same.
To take an example: article 20 (3)of the Indian Constitution, providing that "[n]o person accused of any offence shall

be compelled to be a witness against himself," obviously copies
the language of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution that "no person shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself."'81 5 Notwithstanding this semantic
semblance, the interpretational divergence in both the countries
has been striking. Thus, while courts in the United States have
158. See supra notes 131, 182, 135 and accompanying discussion.
154. The validity of the preceding framework for comparison can be illustrated
through several examples of rights of an accused; limitations of space has prevented us
from embarking upon such an ambitious undertaking.
155. This is stressed in Bhagwandas v. India, All India Rptr. [1961] Mad. 47, 57
(Ramaswami, J.); Narayanlal v. Maneck Phiroze, All India Rptr. [1959] Born. 320, 326,
330-331; P. Rajangam v. Madras, All India Rptr. [1959] Mad. 294, 307 (Ramaswami, J.);
Suryanarayana v. Vijay Commercial Bank, All India Rptr. [1958] A.'. 756, 758; Madanlal
v. State, All India Rptr. [1958] Or. 1, 4.

BUFFALO LAI

REVIEIV

accorded the privilege a liberal construction, indicating that its
scope is as broad "as the mischief against which it seeks to
guard," 156 Indian courts have interpreted the right narrowly.
The technological and general sophistication of organized
crime and the wide range of criminal activities in the United
States have stirred frequent attacks upon the scope given the
right,' 7 because it often conflicts with government's legitimate
inquiries into unlawful, disruptive and antisocial activity.," Perhaps this debate in the United States, concerning the infirmities
of the privilege against self-incrimination, induced the Indian
Supreme Court in the very first case before it, M. P. Sharma v.
Satish Chandra,59 to construe article 20 (3) relatively narrowly:
iT]here is no inherent reason to construe the ambit of this fundamental right as comprising a very wide range. Nor would it be
legitimate to confine it to the barely literal meaning of the
words used, since it is a recognized doctrine that when appropriate a constitutional provision has to be liberally construed,
so as to advance the intendment thereof and to prevent its circumvention. 60

Thus, while in the United States the privilege, notwithstanding the words "criminal case" in the fifth amendment, has been
held to extend to incriminating statements in both criminal and
civil proceedings (including grand jury, legislative, and administrative investigations),'' the words "accused of an offence" in
156. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 459-60 (1966).
157. See, e.g., S. HooK, COMMON SENSE AND THE FiFrH AMENDMENT (1957) (neither
logic, ethics, nor rights of the individual justify the privilege against self-incrimination) ;
1. MAYERS, SHALL WVEAMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT? (1959) (general attack upon the
privilege); Brownell, Immunity from Prosecution Versus Privilege Against Self-Incrin-

ination, 28 TUL. L. REv. 1 (1953) (privilege is an unnecessary hindrance to criminal law
-enforcement); Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional
Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671 (1968); McNaughton, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Its Constitutional Affectation, Raison d'Atre and Miscellaneous Implications, 51
J. Cmu. L.C. & P.S. 138 (1960), in POLICE POWER AND INDIvIDUAL FREEDOM 223 (C.

Sowle ed. 1962).
158. See, e.g., L. MAYERS, SHALL VE AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT? (1959) (general
attack upon the privilege).
159. All India Rptr. [1954] S.C. 300.
160. Id. at 303. The Indian Supreme Court specifically cites 8 J. WiaMoRC, EviMENcz 314, 315
(3d ed. 1940), to show that this privilege "has an undesirable effect
-on social interest . . . in the detection of crime" and "has become a hiding place of crime
.and has outlived its usefulness...
Id. at 303.
161.

See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967): "It is

. . .

clear that the availability

-of the privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is
invoked, but upon the nature of the statement or admission and the exposure which it

mvites. The privilege may, for example, be claimed in a civil, or administrative proceed-

"LAW AND ORDER"

article 20 (3) of the Indian Constitution have been interpreted to
mean that the privilege is confined to an accused person in a
criminal proceeding. Thus, in Narayanlal v. M. P. Mistry,'1 the
petitioner contended that section 240 of the Indian Companies
Act of 1913-which empowered the Inspector of Companies to
issue supeonae duces tecum-offended the constitutional right
guaranteed by article 20 (3). The trial court and the appellate
court rejected this contention and the Supreme Court affirmed.
Relying on several American decisions, 83 it was urged before
the Supreme Court that the words "person accused of any offence"
in article 20 (3) should be given as wide and liberal construction
as in Boyd v. United States:""
[A]ny compulsory discovery by extorting the party's oath, or compelling the production of his private books and papers, to convict him of crime, or to forfeit his property, is contrary to the
principles of a free government .... [I]t is abhorrent to ,the instincts of an American. It may suit the purposes of despotic power;
but it cannot abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and
personal freedom.16 5
[Illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing . . . by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal
modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering
to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person
and property should be liberally construed.1 66

ing, if the statement is or may be inculpatory." Id. at 49. Clapp, Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 10 RUTrERS L. REV. 541 (1956), lists seven various proceedings to which
the privilege may be applicable. See generally P. FREUND, A. SUTHERLAND, M. HowE & E.
BROWN, CONSTTUTIONAL LAw 1514-16 (1967); Chilingirian, State Disbarment Proceedings and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 BUFFALO L. REv. 489 (1968-69) ; Mayer
&Earle, Lawyers, judges and the Fifth Amendment: Discipline in Danger?,51 CHI. B. REc.
13 (Oct. 1969); Powell & Jones, Self-Incrimination and FairPlay-Marchetti, Grosso and
Haynes Examined, 18 Am. U.L. RE. 114 (1968); Comment, Accountants' Workpapers in Federal Tax Investigations: The Taxpayer's PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination,
23 Sw. LJ. 728 (1969); Comment, Privilege Against Self-Inerimination in Bankruptcy
Proceedings, 117 U. PA. L. Rav. 1003 (1969).
162. All India Rptr. [1961] S.C. 29.
163. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 84, 40-42 (1924); Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547 (1892). That Counselman concerned primarily the problem of immunity
statutes was obviously not understood by the lawyers in Narayanlal,as they relied on the
case to support their argument of a liberal construction of the words "person accused of
any offence."
164. 116 US. 616 (1886).
165. Id. at 631-32.
166. Id. at 635.
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Mr. Justice Gajendragadkar's answer to "this eloquent statement of the law"'1 7 which presented an "attractive" 0 8 argument was two-fold. First, under the English law, the protection
against self-incrimination had not been extended to company and
bankruptcy law.0 9 Second, since article 20 had been the subject
matter of some previous decisions' 7" of the Court-showing
that article 20 (3) should be read in the context of the two preceding clauses-it had to be interpreted in light of those decisions.
In one opinion,'7 ' involving the interpretation of article 20 (2)
only, the Court discussed the scope of article 20 generally, examining the interrelation of the relevant terms used in the three
clauses:
The very wording of article 20 and the words used therein-con-

victed, commission of the act charged as an offence, be subjected
to a penalty, commission of the offence, prosecuted and punished,
accused of any offence[-]would indicate that the proceedings

therein contemplated are of the nature of criminal proceedings
before a court of law or a judicial tribunal and the prosecution

in this context would mean an initiation or starting of proceedings of a criminal nature before a court of law or a judicial
tribunal in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the
statute which creates the offence and regulates the procedure. 72
Those decisions also showed that "the character of the ...proceedings as well as the character of the forum before which the
proceedings are initiated or conducted are decisive in the matter.'

73

Applying these principles, the Court held that the in-

vestigation by an inspector appointed under the Indian Companies Act was no more than the work of a "fact-finding commission," the object being to examine the management of the affairs
of the company to find out whether or not any irregularities
have been committed. Admittedly, as a result of the inspector's
report, the government might sanction a criminal prosecution,
but that possible result did not change the complexion of the
167. All India Rptr. [1961] S.C. at 36.
168. Id.
169. In re Atherton [1912] 2 K.B. 251.
170. E.g., Venkataraman v. India, All India Rptr. [1954] S.C. 875; M. P. Sharma 1,
Satish Chandra, All India Rptr. [1954] S.C. 300; Maqbool Hussain v. Bombay [1953]

S.C.R. 730.
171. Maqbool Hussain v. Bombay [1953] S.C.R. 730.
172. Id. at 738-89.
173. Narayanlal v. M.P. Mistry, All India Rptr. [1961] S.C. at 38.
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inspector's investigation. Throughout that investigation "there
[was] no accused person, no accuser and no accusation against
anyone that he had committed an offence."' 74
For the same reasons it has been held that the protection
did not apply to departmental inquiries against a railway servant,
as there was no accusation of any offense within the meaning of
article 20 (3).75 Nor did the privilege attach to proceedings instituted by customs authorities other than those instituted before
a magistrate. Thus, it has been held that a person questioned under section 171-A of the Sea Customs Act of 1878, did not become
an accused person, and the fact that as a result of his statement
he became an accused person was insufficient to attract the protection of article 20 (3).171 The proceeding in which the constitutional immunity may be invoked must be one before a court
of law or judicial tribunal where a person has been "accused" or
has been charged with committing an offense, punishable under
the Indian Penal Code of 1860, or any other special or local
statute imposing criminal sanctions. Unlike the situation in the
United States, where to quote the then Judge Cardozo, "[flit is
enough to wake the privilege into life that there is a reasonable
174. Id. at 89. This case was followed in K. Joseph v. Narayanan, All India Rptr.
[1964] S.C. 1552:
If a person who is not accused of any offence, is compelled to give evidence,
and evidence taken from him under compulsion ultimately leads to an accusation
against him, that would not be a case which would attract the provisions

of Art. 20(3). The main object of Art. 20(8) is to give protection to an
accused person not to be compelled to incriminate himself and that is in con-

sonance with the basic principle of criminal law accepted in our country that
an accused person is entitled to rely on the presumption of innocence in his
favour and cannot be compelled to swear against himself. Therefore, unless
it is shown that a person ordered to be publicly examined under S. 45G

is, before, or at the time when the order for examining him publicly is passed,
an accused person, Art. 20 (8) will not apply.
Id. at 1556. See also Peoples Insurance Co. v. Sardul Singh, All India Rptr. [1962]
Punj. 101, 108-10, which held that section 185 of the Companies Act did not violate
article 20 (3), because there was neither an accusation of an offense nor was the respondent compelled to be a witness against himself.
175. Srikant Upadhya v. India, All India Rptr. [1963] Pat. 38.
176. Laxman Padma v. State, All India Rptr. [1965] Bom. 195. In view of the
decisions of the Supreme Court, Shankerlal v. Collector, Central Excise, All India Rptr.
[1960] Mad. 225 and Basant Kumar v. Collector, Land Customs, All India Rptr. [1961]
Cal. 86, 91 (both cases holding that a person appearing in answer to a notice under
section 171-A, Sea Customs Act of 1878, is entitled to the protection of article
20(3)) and Allen Berry and Co. v. Vivian Bose, All India Rptr. [1960] Punj. 86-98
(holding that as section 6, Commission of Inquiry Act of 1952, did not confer an
immunity coextensive with that under article 20(3), the protection of that article
could be invoked in proceedings before a Commission) are no longer good law.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

possibility of prosecution,"' 177 in India the privilege does not apply to civil proceedings, even though a criminal prosecution may
arise out of such proceedings. And, even in a criminal proceeding
the protection of article 20 (3) is available only "to a person
against whom a formal accusation relating to the commission
of an offence has been levelled which in the normal course may
result in prosecution."' 178 In the United States, on the other hand,
the emphasis has been more on the possibly incriminating nature
of the information sought, and less on the type of proceeding in
79
which such an inquiry takes place.
While in the United States8 0 and in England,""' both the
accused and the witness in a proceeding are protected from answering incriminating questions, a mere witness has no constitutional protection under article 20 (3) of the Indian Constitution.1 2 An American judge is not permitted to ask a defendant
for any explanation when he is confronted with government evidence of guilt and he may not draw any adverse inference from
177. Douglas v. Hafstader, 257 N.Y. 244, 256, 177 N.E. 489, 493 (1931).
178. M. P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, All India Rptr. [1954] S.C. 300, 304 (emphasis
added). The Court, however, did not explain the words "formal accusation." Nor are
these words defined in either the Constitution or in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The
Court merely observed that the protection was available to a person "against whom a
First Information Report has been recorded as accused therein." Id. Obviously, formal
accusation does not require the issuance of process against the person as an accused. The
crucial question is whether the protection extends to any period earlier than the first
information report or to earlier statements, for example, in the proceedings for investigation of that offense for which the person is accused subsequently. Does it make any
material difference, because, instead of acting upon a first information report, the
police started the investigation and arrested the person upon a reasonable suspicion that
he had committed the offense? To take the strict view, there is no accusation unless
either a first information report or a complaint or a police report is made charging
the person with an offense before an officer or a court entitled to take cognizance
of the offense and to proceed upon the information. Further clarification by the Supreme Court is, therefore, needed as to the moment of time when a person may be
said to be "accused of an offence" within the meaning of article 20 (3), because in
M. P. Sharma the Court did not close the doors against the use of a "substantial"
accusation test.
179. See supra notes 161 and 177.
180. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924).
181. P. TAYLOR, EVIDENCE § 1453 (1887).
182. Under section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act of 1872, no witness was excused
from answering any question on the ground that it would subject him to criminal liability or penalty or forfeiture; but at the same time, the law gave him immunit)
from any criminal liability for such evidence except for perjury. The privilege conferred
by article 20 (3) did not touch the existing law relating to a witness. M. P. Sharma
v. Satish Chandra, All India Rptr. [1954] S.C. 300.
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his silence. 8 3 Both the Indian and American self-incrimination
provisions are limited to protection from testimonial compulsion,'1 4 but the American privilege is reinforced by the additional protection of the due process clause 8 5 and the fourth
amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.1sG In the Indian Constitution there is no guarantee to any
fundamental right to privacy analogous to the fourth amendment
of the United States Constitution and the Indian Supreme Court
has refused to import any prohibition against search and seizure
of a person's premises and effects, without his consent, by refusing to adopt a liberal interpretation of article 20 (3).187
These diverse developments in the two countries-sketchily
drawn here as a common sense illustration-can be better appraised and developed against the backdrop of historicallygrounded institutional differences, delineated earlier. Although
the embodiment of the privilege against self-incrimination in the
fifth amendment of the United States Constitution has been
characterized as "one of the great landmarks in man's long struggle to make himself civilized,' 8 8 in India it was only in 1950
for the first time that a limited protection by the Constitution,
under article 20 (3), was conferred upon an accused by affording
him protection against testimonial compulsion. However, many
courts in India (including the Indian Supreme Court) have assumed that article 20 (3) "does not create any new right fundamental or otherwise. Even before the Constitution, no accused
person in India could be compelled to be a witness against himself [and] this clause simply repeats what the law was before
the Constitution.' 81 9 After an historical survey of Indian traditions regarding self-incrimination, the Supreme Court, in the
leading case of M. P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, 90 concluded:
183. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Note, To Take the Stand or Not To
Take the Stand: The Dilemma of the Defendant with a Criminal Record, 4 CoLum.
J.L. & Soc. PROB. 215 (1968).
184. Bombay v. Kathi Kalu, All India Rptr. [1961] S.C. 1808.
185. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165 (1962).
186. See, e.g., Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
187. M. P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, All India Rptr. [1954] S.C. 300.
188. E. GiuSoLD, THE FIFr AMENDMENT TODAY 54 (1955).
189. Satya Kinkar v. Nikhil Chandra, All India Rptr. [1951] Cal. 101, 104 (Harries,
C.J.). See also Subayya Gounder v. Bhoopala Subramanian, All India Rptr. [1959] Mad.
396, 399.
190. All India Rptr. [19 5 4 ] S.C. 300.
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[S]o far as the Indian law is concerned it may be taken that the
protection against self-incrimination continues more or less as
in the English common law, so far as the accused and production
of documents are concerned, but that it has been modified as
regards oral testimony of witnesses, by introducing compulsion and providing immunity from prosecution on the basis
of such compelled evidence.191
A demonstration that this observation is inaccurate is beyond the

scope of this article; however, it is appropriate to mention here
that the privilege does not apply to civil proceedings or to proceedings which may involve the imposition of penalties or forfeitures.'
One reason for the difference in the nature and scope of the privilege against self-incrimination in the United States and India
may be found in the differing historical frameworks in which the
privilege originated.
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1898, were enacted at a time when the primary aim
of the government was to maintain law and order. The legislature was merely a branch of the executive government, and hence
was, by its very nature, not necessarily concerned with the liberty
of the individual. The British rulers of that time, therefore, did
not incorporate in the Indian legal system every principle of the
English common law concerning individual liberties.
On the other hand, the colonial Americans, who framed the
Bill of Rights, looked to the common law for the protection of their
liberties (in much the same way as Sir Edward Coke had looked
to the Magna Carta).' Nearly all of the state constitutions followed the memorable language of Virginia's Declaration of Rights.
The founding fathers, Mason and Madison in particular, within
the historical framework, shaped the right against self-incrim191. Id. at 303 (emphasis added).
192. Statutory provisions have been made which compel a person to produce information or evidence in proceedings which may involve imposition of penalties against
him. Under the Banking Companies Act, 1949, §§ 45-G, 45-L, as amended by Act 62,
1953, provision has been made for public examination of persons against whom an inquiry is made. Likewise, the Indian Companies Act, 1913, § 140; the Companies Act, 1956,
§ 240; the Foreign Exchange Regulations, 1947, § 19 (2) ; the Sea Customs Act, 1878, § 54A;
the Medicinal and Toilet Preparations Act, 1955, § 10; the Indian Official Secrets Act,
1923, § 8; the Petroleum Act, 1934, § 27; the Public Gambling Act, 1867, § 7; the Representation of the People Act, 1951, § 95 (1) -to mention only a few statutes-compel persons
to furnish information which may be incriminatory or expose them to penalties.
193. See generally Stoebuck, Reception of English Common Law in the American
Colonies, 10 Wm. & MARY L. R.v. 393 (1968).
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ination and embodied it in the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United StatesI' 4-in language that appears either verbatim, or with immaterial substitutions of synonymous words, in
almost all the state constitutions.' 95 The variety of phraseology
in various state constitutions did not affect the basic core of the
principle against self-incrimination; nevertheless (and here the
relevance of federal structure differentiation will become apparent)
after the adoption of the fourteenth amendment in 1868, the
United States Supreme Court had to face the problems relative to
the applicability of the fifth amendment to the state proceedings.
Since all states provided a privilege against self-incrimination, the
real issue now was not whether there was a privilege available in
state proceedings, but rather, what constituted compulsory selfincrimination.
For example, the right to comment to the jury (an institution
virtually missing in India) upon a defendant's failure to testify was
held not to be self-incrimination in New Mexico by the rules of
court procedure; the same result was reached by judicial decisions
in Connecticut, Iowa and New Jersey; and under state constitutions
in California and Ohio. 196 But such comment was held to be prohibited by the fifth amendment in federal proceedings. 97 Therefore, to achieve uniformity, in a long process of judicial dynamism
from Twining v. New Jersey9 8 to Adamson v. California"9 to
Malloy v. Hogan,0 0 the Supreme Court, through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, had to struggle to bring
federal standards to state proceedings. The applicability of the
guarantee to both state and federal governments by one constitutional document in India accounts for the absence of such social

194. A number of scholars have attempted to trace the development of the privilege
from its English common law origins to its inclusion in the fifth amendment of the
United States Constitution; these earlier studies have now been dwarfed by the seminal
work of L. LEvy, ORIGINS OF rm FIFrm AmENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SEtF-INCRINMINATION (1968). See also Levy & Leder, "Exotic Fruit": The Right Against Compulsory Self-Incrimination in Colonial New York, 20 WAt. &MARY Q. 3 (1963).
195. McNaughton, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Its Constitutional Affectation, Raison d'Atre and Miscellaneous Implications, 51 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 138
(1960), in POLICE PowE. AND INDIVmUAL FmRoor, 223 (C. Sowle ed. 1962).
196. 8 J. XWIGMoE, EVIDENCE § 2252 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
197. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1933).

198.

211 U.S. 78 (1908).

199. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
200. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEV

engineering to neutralize the "incongruity [which lies] at the heart
of [the American] federal system" 201-even though the former copies
the guarantee from the United States Constitution.
IV.

THE GOVERNMENT AS LAWBREAKER: AN EMERGING
PARADOX IN INDIA AND A SUGGESTED APPROACH

20 2

The controversy rages today in the United States as to whether
the "crime control" or the "due process" model shall set the
tenor of the administration of justice. Although order and public
security are essential to the evolutionary development of a democracy, fairness of procedure used in obtaining those ends cannot
be dispensed with. When a government becomes a lawbreaker,
there can be no respect for its laws; when a government depends
upon an adversary system to apply the sanction of the law, that
system must adhere to its predefined and impartial procedures
of application, or the system loses its justification and that which
makes it functional-the acquiescence of the accused to its processes.
One major problem in the realm of the protection of the
rights of the accused-nay the problem of crime itself-in India
concerns the center-state relationship. The distinctive concept of
Indian federalism-that the marked central bias of the Indian Constitution indicates that the Indian states have a lesser degree of
autonomy than the American states-has undergone significant
change by the general elections of 1967 which terminated the
hegemony of the Congress party and cast the center-state relations
in a different and more complex mold. Federal conflicts had been
largely avoided in the past because the will of the Congress ruled
the country, and the center and states worked harmoniously;
but with the changed conditions in that the Congress party is no
longer securely entrenched in power in states,20- 3 a number of com201. Id. at 27 (Harlan, J.).
202. The author desires to thank Mr. Ram Niwas Mirdha, State Minister for Home
Affairs, Government of India, for his encouragement in the preparation of this section
of the paper. However, neither Mr. Mirdha nor the Government of India are in anyway
responsible for the views expressed herein.
208. Many of the Indian states have been plagued by political instability and frequent changes of government, maintained since the 1967 elections. For an admirable
account of this phenomenon see Palmer, India's Fourth General Election, 7 ASIAN StIRvay 275-91 (1967); Singh, Political Development or Political Decay in India?, 44 PACIFIC
ArFAms 65, 66-72 (1971). See also S. KOCHANEK, THE CONGRESS PARTY OF INDIA: Ti
DYNAMICS OF ONE-PARTY DEMOCRACY (1968); STATE POLITICS IN INDIA (M. Weiner cd.
1968).
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plex problems have arisen, particularly in the field of the judicial remedies and administration of justice. The problem of "law
and order" is one such issue which has generated acute controversy
in recent months.
A.

The ConstitutionalScheme and Waning Public Order

A summary reference to the legislative distribution of powers
between the center and the states is, perhaps, appropriate to
appreciate this problem in its correct perspective. The ambit of
and limitations on their powers are found in article 246 read with
article 245, and the three lists of schedule VII.2°4 Entry 1 of the

union list provides for the defense of India and of every part thereof, and entry 2 authorizes the use of naval, military and air
forces and any other forces of the union for that purpose. Entry 1
of the state list deals with public order but excludes the use of
naval, military or air force or any other forces of the union, in
aid of the civil power. 0 5 Entry 2 provides for the establishment
and maintenance of police forces including railway and village
police.2 8 Entry 4 empowers the states to establish prisons, reforma-

tories, Borstal institutions2 7 and the like and to detain persons
in them and to make arrangements with other states for the
use of prisons and other institutions. Entry 1 of the concurrent list
provides for criminal law including all matters included in the
204. Three lists of powers are included in the Constitution: the union list, comprising ninety-seven subjects confided exclusively to the central government; the state list,
comprising sixty-six subjects confided exclusively to the states; and the concurrent list,
comprising forty-seven subjects confided to both central and state governments. See
Freund, A Supreme Court in a Federation:Some Lessons from Legal History, 53 COLunvM.

L. REv. 597, 603, 611 n.56 (1953).
205. INDIA CONsT. state list, entry 1 (1950). Government of India Act, 1935, list
I, item 1, had a similar provision: "Public order (but not including the use of
His Majesty's naval, military or air forces in aid of civil power) .... " For helpful
annotations on judicial decisions concerning "public order" under this entry see 5
D. BAsu, COMMENTARY ON THE CoNsrrrtrrsON OF INDIA 210-11 (5th rev. ed. 1970).
206. INDIA CONsT. state list, entry 2 (1950). This entry is identical to Government
of India Act, 1935, list II, item 3. See D. BAsu, supra note 205, at 211.
207. Named after Borstal, a village in Kent, Borstal institutions are reform schools
for delinquents between the ages of 16 and 23. These schools follow a system stressing
occupational training, special attention to the individual, and highly organized supervision after dismissal. (Incidentally, as an interesting sidelight, a novel question was
recently canvassed by the House of Lords in Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., [1970]
2 All E.R. 294 (H.L.) : Is the state under any civil liability for the damages perpetrated
by Borstal boys who through the negligence of its officers have escaped custody? In a
move almost unprecedented in British legal history, the aggrieved company successfully
sought to recover in tort from the Home Office.)
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Indian Penal Code at the commencement of the Constitution but
excluding, inter alia, the use of naval, military or air forces or
any other forces of the union, in aid of the civil power. Entry 2
provides for criminal procedure including all matters included in
the Code of Criminal Procedure at the commencement of the
Constitution. (While in the United States the legislative and administrative jurisdiction over ordinary criminal justice is reserved
to the.states, in India the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1898, form the lex loci for the entire
nation. There is no uniform standard for criminal justice across
the United States. Each state has its own idiosyncracies, which
either are arbitrarily based upon the authority of antiquity or else
purposefully exist to satisfy a particular cultural need.) Under
entry 9 of the union list, the Parliament is, and under entry 3 of
the concurrent list, both Parliament and the state legislatures
are, empowered to make laws for preventive detention for reasons
connected with the several matters specified in the respective
entries. Entry 9 of the union list mentions reasons connected with
defense, foreign affairs and security of India, while entry 3 of the
concurrent list speaks of reasons connected with the security of
a state, the maintenance of public order and the maintenance of
supplies and services essential to the community.208
This overall constitutional scheme invests the states with
exclusive authority to legislate in the realm of public order, police,
and administration of justice. The underlying premise for such
authority is that Indian federalism seeks national uniformity only
for matters that do not lend themselves to local diversity. While
the state list is based upon local interests and the union list on
national interest, the concurrent list includes matters which involve
varying degrees of both. In view of the states' exclusive concern
with public order and police, the highly tenable argument has
been advanced that, upon a breakdown of "law and order" in any

208. The subject of "preventive detention" has been one of the hotly debated issues
in India. For fuller treatment of this subject see generally D. BAYLEY, PREVENTIVE DE.
TENTION IN INDIA (1962) ; Tripathi, Preventive Detention: The Indian Experience, 9 A.
J. CoMP. L. 219 (1960), in AMERIcAN JOURNAL. OF COMPARATIVE LAW READER 83 (H.
Yentema ed. 1966).
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state, it is the state's responsibility, without assistance2 9 from the
20
central government, to restore normal conditions.
Some instances of waning public order in the states should
be mentioned. Recently, the non-Congress governments in the
states, particularly the communists in Kerala and West Bengal,
determined to decimate or weaken the center, showed calculated
indifference to the student community's agitations, violence, and
threats of violence which were in fact, aided, abetted and excited
by their party.211 They instructed the police not to intervene and,
to make things worse, a government minister went to the extent
of saying that he would give rifles to pro-communist students in
order to destroy another group, supposed to be against communism.212 Likewise, the police of Calcutta gave no protection to the
unfortunate persons who had been surrounded by communist
workers in the gheraos of various industrial units.218 After the
leader of Shiv Sena, a para-military group, had recently announced
that no minister of the central government would enter Bombay,
the state government was reluctant to thwart the enforcement of
this threat, permitting the ransoming of even a metropolitan city
like Bombay. The extent of this growing lawlessness climaxed recently in the unprecedented communal holocaust in Bhiwandi,
where hundreds of Muslims were brutally massacred by Hindu
fanatics. 214 It is stated that for months past weapons such as bows
and arrows, daggers, knives, spears and steel tipped lathis
(sticks) were being supplied to the volunteers of the Jan Sangh,
Hindu Mahasabha and Rashtriya Syam Sevak Sangh in preparation
for the carnage against Muslims. The intensely right-wing Congress
209. Such assistance would be channeled through Central Reserve Police Force,
governed by the Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949. The act-a mere replacement of
the pre-Independence statute, Crown Representative's Police Force Law, 1939-seeks to aid
Indian states in the maintenance of law and order during periods of lawlessness and disorder. The legislative competence of this legislation falls within the ambit of entry 2 of
the union list, enabling the Parliament to enact laws concerning "[n]aval, military and
air forces for] any other armed forces of the Union," and is coextensive with the
union's executive power under article 73.
210. See A. RAY, TENSION AREAs IN THE INDIA'S FEDERAL Sysrm 57 (1970). See also
id. at 53-54.
211. Shanti Swrup, Student Unrest in India, in PROTEST AND DiscoNTENT 151, 158
(B. Crick & W. Robson eds. 1970).
212. Id.
213. 1 K. MUNSHI, INDIAN CONsrrrTioNAL DOCUMrENTS-PILRIMAGE TO FRaxom 343
(1967).
214. See supra note 38, and the accompanying discussion.
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ministry in Gujarat, it is alleged, was perhaps aware of the undercurrent of preparations for the genocide of Muslims but hardly
did anything to halt its momentum.
B.

FederalPowers of Intervention

Because police and the maintenance of law and order are
exclusively state subjects, the federal government in such instances
finds it difficult to intervene to check mob rule and hooliganism,
except by calling in the armed forces. 10 In so doing, it may or may
not, however, declare martial law, the power being secreted under
entries 1 and 2 of the union list. But if a rebellion or revolt in a
place-"internal disturbance"-can be put down by the use of
armed forces, without declaring an emergency under article 352which is tantamount to a declaration of martial law-there is no
constitutional requirement for such proclamation. The reason is
apparent. Before the machinery of issuing such a proclamation can
be activated, grave and irreparable damage may be done if, in an
emergency, prompt action is not immediately taken. Article 355
requires that "[i]t shall be the duty of the Union to protect every
state against external aggression and internal disturbance and to
ensure that the government of every state is carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. '210 When this article
215. Entry 2 of the concurrent list, providing for criminal procedure including all
matters included in the Code of Criminal Procedure at the commencement of the Constitution, does not exclude the use of the forces of the union in aid of states to
restore order. The Code of Criminal Procedure contains provisions enabling magistrates
to call for military assistance to put down a riot; the 1962 amendment of the Code,
substituting the assistance of the "Armed Forces" in place of military assistance, would
suggest that it is a subject of concurrent legislative power.
However, the maintenance of public order which requires the assistance of the
"Armed Forces" is expressly beyond the legislative competence of the state legislature and
therefore of the state executive. As entry 1 of state list and entry 1 of concurrent
list expressly exclude the use of the "Armed Forces" in aid of civil authority, it is
unlikely that the President would assent to an amendment of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the state legislatures, which would provide for a use of the "Armed Forces"
different from that provided by parliamentary law.
216. This article does not require the consent of the state to the discharge of the
duty there imposed. In this respect article 855 may be contrasted with the Commonwealth of Australia Act, 1900, § 119: "[T]he Commonwealth shall protect every state
against invasion and, on the application of the executive government of the state, against
domestic violence." Article 355 thus obviates the necessity for the refined distinctions
which have been made in Australian cases on the limited nature of the incidental power
of the Commonwealth to maintain peace, order and good government. In Australia, the
position appears to be that the Commonwealth cannot intervene to protect the state from
internal violence against its will, unless the violence is of such a nature that it prevents the Commonwealth from exercising the functions and the powers which belong to
it under the Constitution.
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is read in conjunction With entries 1 and 2 of the union list and
entry 1 of the state list (read with article 73), there is ample justification for the federal government to put down rebellion or
quell a state of riot by the use of "armed forces" including the
Central Reserve Police Force and the Border Security Force.21 7
However, as a practical matter, the federal government obviously cannot use the "armed forces" to quell day-to-day civic disturbances, except in really grave situations. The existence of a
proclamation of emergency, 18 an agreement between or among
some states to transfer a particular subject to Parliament,2 19 and
the breakdown of constitutional apparatus in a state = ° are clear-cut
situations in which Parliament can legislate on a state subject.
Also, article 249 provides that if the upper house of the federal
legislature, "called the Council of States, passes by two-thirds vote
a resolution declaring it "necessary or expedient in the national
interest" that Parliament should make laws concerning any matter
constitutionally within the exclusive legislative competence of the
states, the Parliament acquires competence to enact such laws 221
for the states, operative for not more than one year. The currency
of such legislation may, however, be enlarged for additional periods
of one year at a time by resolutions of the Council of States. A
parliamentary law made in exercise of this power, insofar as it
217. There has been a sharp controversy between the center and the states about
the deployment of central reserve police force in the states. For example, the states of
Kerala (during the strike of central government employees in September 1968) and West
Bengal (Durgapur and Cossipore episodes in March and April 1969, respectively, involving violent agitations at two industrial units) took serious exception to the unilateral
decision of the Government of India in deploying some units of central reserve police
force in their states without their prior consent or even tacit approval. Doubtlessly, the
central government's power to deploy such forces for the protection of federal property
and its own officers in states would not require their consent. The Kerala incident is
nicely analyzed in Kumar, The Kerala Crisis: 1968, 20 LAw REviEw 176 (1968). For
Durgapur and Cossipore incidents in West Bengal see the debates in the Indian Parliament during March and April 1969.
218. INDIA CONSr. art. 250 (1950).
219. INDIA CONST. art. 252 (1950). Cf. Commonwealth of Australia Act, 1900, § 51.
Clause (2) of article 252 contemplates that if there is any repugnancy between
state law concerning the subject matter of the resolution (of the requesting states) and
the parliamentary legislation enacted in pursuance of the resolution, the state law shall
become void. See, e.g., R.M.D.C. (Mysore) Private, Ltd. v. State of Mysore, All India
96
Rtpr. [1 2] S.C. 594.
220. INDIA CONST. arts. 356-57 (1950).
221. That such laws are temporary will be evident by some laws passed by the
Council of States. For example, Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Amendment
Act, 1950; Supply and Prices of Goods Act, 1950; Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act,
1951.
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exceeds the normal competency of Parliament, ceases to have effect
six months after the resolution ceases to be in force. Obviously,
though useful, article 249, as its terms show, is meant to deal only
with temporary situations.22
C.

Should "Public Order" Be an Exclusive State Subject?:
A Suggested Approach

That the concern for maintaining "law and order," a concern
which ought to be essentially apolitical, should become enmeshed
in the ideological wrangles of diverse political parties in the states
raises questions of far-reaching constitutional and practical significance about the wisdom of leaving these subjects exclusively with
the states. True, flexibility is provided in certain situations by
the constitutional admonition to the states to execute the federal
laws and to carry out their functions so as not to injure union
interests. 23 An example of the operation of this provision can be
seen in the matter of the policing of the railways. While railways
are a union subject,2 24 the responsibility for policing them rests
with the state governments. Accordingly, article 257 empowers the
union government to give directives for insuring that the effective
administration of railways does not suffer through the inadequacy
or inefficiency of state railway police. (Such provision for federal
directives is foreign to the American constitutional scheme.) Nonimplementation of the directives of the union concerning railways
222. Professors Jessup and Dowling, in a conference with Sir Benegal Rau, regarded
this article very important. 3 THE FRAMING OF INDIA's CONSTTUTION 2221-222 (B. Shiva
Rao ed. 1967). This article has, however, been severely criticized by A. CHANDA, FmERALISM IN INDIA 89-91 (1965), among others. The arguments against it may be marshalled as follows: First, only a constitutional amendment can readjust the distribution of
powers between the federation and its units. Second, it has to be remembered that the
representation of states in the Council of States is very unequal (e.g., Uttar Pradesh
34 and Assam 7). As a result, a minority of states in the Council commanding a
majority of seats can, with the connivance or support of the center, altogether overrule the viewpoint of the states with minority representation. Not even the federation
of the British times established by the Government of India Act of 1985 envisaged
such bestowal of high authority on the center. The danger in this regard will be
greater with one party dominating the center and alternative parties holding power In
small states. In the contemporary political situation in India, this danger is potentially
acute.
223. INDIA CONsr. arts. 256-57 (1950).
224. INDIA CONsT. union list, entry 22 (1950). It should be noted that at tile time
of the drafting of the Indian Constitution, the central government had only railways as
its major property. It is only in recent years that the government-owned industrial units
have multiplied in several states, giving rise to the increased role of central Reserve
Police Force in several states.
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would enable the President to declare that a situation has arisen
in which the government of the state cannot be carried on in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, 2 5 thereby permitting temporary supersession of the state government by central
t 6
assumption of its powers.2
But it is unlikely that the refusal of a state government to
adhere to a federal directive, which had been issued beyond the
doubtful constitutional power of the center, would activate the
mechanism whereby the union would assume the governance of
the state. Since a state has exclusive executive powers over matters
in the state list,227 it could legitimately ignore directives of the
federal government in the areas of "police" and "public order" if
this action clearly did not militate against other particular parliamentary legislation. Thus, it would seem that the assumption by
the center of the powers of a state government could only follow
a refusal to effectuate a federal directive designed to implement
matters on the union list. An exception to this rule, however, might
be found in the issuance of a directive pursuant to the Indian Penal
Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure-matters on the concurrent list but over which federal parliamentary legislation exercises preemptive control. Since these codes are utterly dependent
upon the state police for their enforcement, central directives to
secure their objectives would seem constitutional. Such a tack,
though it, in itself, could do nothing to curb the state's prosecutorial discretion, might prove a useful union strategy in dealing
with the state's dereliction in maintaining "law and order" referred to above.
Notwithstanding these powers, their use to neutralize the
recalcitrance of a state cannot be a regular feature, for the states
have primary responsibility for the maintenance of public order
through their own police militia. The recent report of the Administrative Reforms Commission, in its painfully miniscule treatment of law and order,-2 s is cognizant of this agonizing dilemma,
but in a very ambivalent manner:
225. INDIA CONs. art. 865 (1950).
226. INDIA CONSr. art. 356 (1950).
227. INDIA CONsrT. art. 162 (1950).
228.

GOVERNMENT

OF

INDIA,

TnE

ADMINISTRATIVE

REFORMS

COMMISSION,

REPORT

ON CENTRE-STATE RELATIONSHIP 37-38 (1969). While the Commission had study-team
reports on all aspects of the problems concerning center-state relationships prepared,
surprisingly, no such report was prepared on "law and order." The Commission's
treatment of the problem is thus in no way a depth analysis of the subject.
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The issue of direction by -the Centre to a State is . . . an extreme step and should be taken only in cases of absolute necessity,
when no other means of securing the objectives are available.
The assumption of governance by the President is a drastic medicine prescribed in the Constitution as a last resort, which cannot
be administered as daily food as a matter of course. Short of
the use of the extreme measure of issuing directions, other suit22
able remedies should be devised for achieving the purpose. D

What are these suitable remedies? They are not even suggested by
the Commission, which, in fact, skirts the whole problem. It is not
inconceivable that in years to come occasions of conflict due to
differences in ideology and program may become so frequent that
the federal government will have to establish alternative machinery for insuring compliance with its orders. 0 However, it would
be precipitous to think in terms of drastically changing the prevailing federal system. We have to avoid two extremes. Extreme
centralization will cause overstrain and friction, leading perhaps
to frustration and growth of fissiparous tendencies. On the other
hand, allowing each state to tread its own way without recognizing
the fact of interdependence, will be equally ruinous to the basic
unity of India.
The present state of affairs is so totally without clear structure
and so lacking in guidance as to when federal intervention is appropriate or permissible that some action is urgently needed to clarify
the instances in which the federal government can act to resolve
broad problems of "law and order" within the states. Occurrences
such as the Bhiwandi massacre must not be susceptible to governmental approval, whether overt or tacit. It is a canard to talk of
protecting the rights of the accused when instances of governmental
lawbreaking can, with impunity, obliterate the most fundamental
human right that individuals possess.
Precipitous and unwise as it is to seek major constitutional
change without some consensus among the various parties in the
Indian body politic, it would be pragmatic to devise solutions for
these problems within the existing constitutional framework. Mea229. Id. at 37.
230. The Administrative Reforms Commission, however, did not recommend the
dual machinery for the execution of federal machineries. The execution of federal
power by the state officials under the supervision of the center is practised, for instance, in German and Swiss federations. Frederick & Guttman, The Federal Executive,
in STUDxS IN FEDERALISm 63, 69 (R. Bowie and C. Friedrich eds. 1954).
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sures which are feasible and might readily be accepted and which
involve minimal change in the present constitutional structure
should be explored. The suggestions that all state and, concurrent
lists may altogether be scrapped and that all the powers of legislation be entrusted to the union which would delegate such powers
of legislation as may be appropriate to the states is, to say the
least, fraught with despairing implications. Such reaction may
well be the natural response of those deeply disturbed by the
perplexities in establishing a well-balanced federalism. Such an
extreme step is unnecessary. The states' cavalier attitude in
maintaining law and order could perhaps be significantly impaired
by transferring "public order" and "police" to the concurrent
list. Such a change would deprive the states of their exclusive
legislative aegis which has heretofore legitimized their calculated
indifference, for Parliament would then be competent beyond any
doubt to pass legislation in matters concerning law and order.
In this regard, it is perhaps not without significance that when
the Draft Constitution was being discussed in the Constituent

Assembly, Mr. Brajeshwar Prasad had moved an amendment to
transfer "public order"2 ' and "police 2- 2 to the union list,
but on a point of order proposed to move them to the concurrent
list. Though unadopted, the arguments he presented in support of
the amendment have much contemporary relevance:
[T]he administration of public order in the provinces has not been
of a satisfactory character. They have not the resources to maintain an efficient system of administration. Seventy-two percent
of the budget of Assam goes in the form of salary bills. The'
other twenty-eight percent is left for managing a large number
of subjects. The result has been deterioration in the efficiency
of the administration. There are also some states and provinces
on the borders of foreign states. Is it the opinion of the House
that it is not risky, it is wise to leave the question of public
order entirely in the hands of the provincial governments? In
a state like Assam and East Punjab . .. [which] are on the borders
of foreign states . . . it is necessary that the power to maintain
public order should remain in the hands of the central Government. With the limited resources at their disposal, it will not be
possible for these states to maintain public order.

231. 9 C.A.D. 864. The amendment was not adopted.
232. Id. at 867. The amendment was withdrawn. Id. at 868.
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,The [partitioned] provinces of West Bengal and East Punjab
. . . are suffering from the problem of relief and rehabilita.

tion, from the problem of migration of population, and there
has also been infiltration of subversive elements in the services
of the other provices. I do not say that the services of the other
provinces are sage; there has been infiltration in the services
of the other provinces also .

. .

. The machinery of law and

order has been considerably weakened. Lawlessness prevails in
many provinces. The pursuit of power politics by provincial ministers and the growth of caste feelings have shattered all semblance of civilised administration. I, therefore, strongly feel
that public order should become a Central subject. There are
dangers within and dangers without, and we cannot depend
upon the loyalty of the provincial administration in times of
crises. 233

Now, it would, perhaps, be only appropriate to give recognition
to the prophetic words of Brajeshwar Prasad and establish the
legislative competence of Parliament vis-4-vis problems of law and
order beyond the pale of any doubt.
Unlike the role of the Supreme Court of the United States, the
Indian Supreme Court's role is such that it would be unrealistic
to expect it to transform the Indian federal system with its division
of powers between the states on the one hand and the central
government on the other, into a unitary government with all
powers concerning "law and order" centralized in New Delhi, and
administered in part through subordinate states. =4 What the Supreme Court of the United States has accomplished in federalizinge 5 and constitutionalizing the American criminal law through
the fourteenth amendment will not be possible in India because
of the absence of a due process clause in its Constitution. However,
in the ultimate analysis, the dogma of federalism will not help to
solve the problems of law and order any more than the dogma of
233. Id. at 864-65.
234. The question can be restated with different emphasis: By breaching their
duties to govern responsibly, to what extent have the states forced the Supreme Court

to expand the sphere of the federal government's control in insuring the political,
economic and social well-being of all its citizens.
235. See generally, Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of
Criminal Justice, 8 DEPAUL L. Rxv. 212 (1959); Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal
Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1956); Comment, Federalism and the Criminal
Law-A National Standard?, 16 CATHoLic U.L. REv. 401 (1966-67); Comment, Custodial
Interrogation as a Tool of Law Enforcement: Miranda v. Arizona and the Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure, 21 Sw. L.J. 253 (1967).
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"states"' rights. Accommodation, cooperation, thorough perception of problems, balance-it is these that enable federalism to be a
house of many mansions. And these by-products can, perhaps, be
most readily appurtenant to the legislative process.

